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What Will China Do When Land
Use Rights Begin to Expire?
Gregory M. Stein*
ABSTRACT
China does not permit the private ownership of land.
Instead, private parties may obtain the right to use property for
up to seventy years. These parties own the structures on the land
but not the underlying real estate. China’s recent economic boom
hinges on the success of its real estate market, but the
government has not yet addressed three critical questions it
must answer soon: Does the holder of a land use right have the
ability to renew that right when it expires? If the holder has this
ability, must it pay to renew the right? And, if the holder must
pay, how much?
While it is always perilous to guess how the Chinese
government will act, it is instructive to examine how the
government has behaved in similar situations in the past. To
begin with, the Chinese government expends great effort to avoid
social unrest and upheaval. In addition, the government
frequently sidesteps new problems and waits to see how the
private market responds, later endorsing and officially
implementing the most successful outcomes. Finally, both
government bodies and individual government officials are
heavily invested in the real estate market and thus care
personally about the answers to these renewability questions. By
keeping these facts in mind, it becomes somewhat less
hazardous to forecast how China will act as the first land use
rights approach their expiration dates.
This Article addresses the renewability of Chinese land use
rights. Part II describes the different paths the government
might follow as land use rights begin to expire. Part III assesses
how the government has acted in the past in an effort to predict
which of these different options the government is mostly likely
to choose. Part IV pulls back and seeks to locate the resolution of
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these important questions in the broader context of China’s
uncertain movement toward the rule of law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
China does not allow the private ownership of land.1 Instead, the
government authorizes private parties to use land while the

1.
XIANFA art. 10 (2004) (China) (“Land in the cities is owned by the State.
Land in the rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those portions
which belong to the State as prescribed by law; house sites and privately farmed plots
of cropland and hilly land are also owned by collectives.”); Wuquan Fa [Property Rights
Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007,
effective Oct. 1, 2007), P.R.C. LAWS arts. 45–69 (China) (delineating different types of
property that are publicly or privately owned and clarifying that individual persons
may not own land).
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government continues to own the underlying land.2 The Chinese land
use right is not perpetual, however, and lasts for a maximum of forty,
fifty, or seventy years, depending on the purpose for which the right
was granted.3 The modern Chinese land use right dates back to the
late 1980s, which means that most land use rights are still in their
first generation, and few rights have expired yet.4 As increasing
numbers of land use rights approach their termination dates, the
Chinese government will need to answer three essential questions: (1)
Does the holder of a land use right have the ability to renew that
right when it expires? (2) If the holder has this ability, must it pay to
renew the right? And, (3) if the holder must pay, how much? The
government also will need to decide whether the answers to these
questions vary depending on the purpose for which the land use right
was granted, perhaps reaching a different answer for residential
property than for commercial or industrial land.
In predicting how the Chinese government will act as these
questions become more pressing, it is instructive to observe how the
government has behaved when new and important questions have
arisen in the real estate market in the past. Although predicting

2.
XIANFA art. 10 (2004) (China) (“The right to the use of land may be
transferred according to law.”); see also Wuquan Fa [Property Rights Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct.
1, 2007), P.R.C. LAWS art. 39 (China) (“The owner of . . . real property . . . has the rights
to possess, use, seek profits from and dispose of the real property . . . according to law,”
with ownership of real rights referring to “the exclusive right of direct control enjoyed
by the holder . . . over a specific property,” id., art. 2); see generally Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan Churang He Zhuanrang Zanxing
Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on Assigning and Transferring the Urban State-Owned
Land-Use Right] (promulgated by the State Council, May 19, 1990, effective May 19,
1990), Peking U. art. 8 (China) (“The assignment of the right to the use of the land
refers to the act of the State as the owner of the land who, within the term of a certain
number of years, assigns the right to the use of the land to land users . . . .”).
3.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan
Churang He Zhuanrang Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on Assigning and
Transferring the Urban State-Owned Land-Use Right] (promulgated by the State
Council, May 19, 1990, effective May 19, 1990), Peking U. art. 12 (China) (setting
different terms for different uses of the land); PATRICK A. RANDOLPH JR. & LOU JIANBO,
CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW 127–28 (2000) (observing that the constitutional
amendment authorized the granting of land use rights but that the State Council
established the actual durational limits by regulation); see also Chengshi Fangdichan
Guanli Fa [Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, revised Aug. 30, 2007, effective
Aug. 30, 2007), P.R.C. LAWS art. 8 (China) (authorizing the granting of land use rights
for a fixed number of years).
4.
In a small number of cases, governments granted land use rights that
lasted for less than the maximum permissible term. For example, in a few instances,
twenty-year rights have come up for renewal or soon will. See, e.g., Lucy Hornby, China
Lease Expiries Prompt Property Rights Angst, FIN. TIMES, May 2, 2016 (“The
simmering issue of property rights in China has burst into the open with the upcoming
expiry of [twenty-year] residential leases in several wealthy cities and a contentious
plan to charge homeowners to renew them.”).
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government action in China is risky, Chinese government behavior
tends to follow certain patterns, which suggests that the government
will continue to act in those ways in the future. First, the government
tries mightily to avoid social unrest and upheaval. 5 The government
discourages public protest and has sought in the past to reduce the
likelihood that citizens will engage in this type of activity.6 In fact,
communitarian principles are written directly into China’s Property
Rights Law.7
Second, the Chinese government often refrains from acting as an
“early adopter.” Rather than responding promptly to new legal
questions, the government often chooses to sit on the sidelines and
observe how other, more market-driven actors seek to solve new
problems.8 The government regularly allows the business community
to develop informal practices as new questions arise. If the business
community responds wisely, with practices that prove successful in
these test situations, the government might ratify these practices
officially; if it does not, the government will pursue a different path or
wait for further, more successful private-sector action.9 Instead of
adopting legislation or regulations that might prove short-sighted,
the government prefers to let the business community have the first
opportunity to confront new questions. By allowing institutions to
develop unofficially, the government reduces the risk that it will
fashion formal institutions that function poorly.10 This approach
preserves the government’s credibility and also recognizes that the
private market may be better suited to experimenting and weeding
out the less promising alternatives.
Third, the government itself is a regular and important
participant in the real estate market, as are many highly placed
government officials, which means that institutional and personal

5.
See infra Part III.
6.
See infra Part III.
7.
See infra Part III.
8.
See infra Part III.
9.
See infra Part III.
10.
See, e.g., Peter Ho, In Defense of Endogenous, Spontaneously Ordered
Development: Institutional Functionalism and Chinese Property Rights, 40 J. PEASANT
STUD. 1087, 1089–90 (2013), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03066150.2013.
866553 [https://perma.cc/8US7-WLWY] (archived Feb. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Ho, In
Defense of Endogenous] (“Conventional wisdom is that institutions affect the economy
and can be intentionally designed, and that formal tenure is a precondition to economic
growth. But China does not follow these patterns.”); id. at 1090 (“The vexing
problem . . . is that socio-economic phenomena are rarely a straightforward matter of
cause and effect, yet are in reality the result of mutual interaction”); Peter Ho,
Introduction: The Chicken of Institutions or the Egg of Reforms?, in DEVELOPMENTAL
DILEMMAS: LAND REFORM AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN CHINA 1, 18 (Peter Ho ed.,
2005) [hereinafter Ho, Introduction] (“Rather than conceptualizing economic
restructuring in terms of a ‘chicken or egg’ dilemma, we should understand it as an
intricate interplay between institutions and socio-economic parameters.”).
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self-interest may factor into government decisions.11 The government
owns the underlying land and imposes development restrictions when
it grants land use rights to private parties.12 The government also
owns or controls most of the major lending institutions13 and holds
equity interests in entities that own and develop real estate.
Individual government officials often own or control interests in
major real estate projects. Moreover, it is very common for real estate
professionals to forge strong personal relationships with government
officials, even if those officials do not hold equity interests in their
projects. Because individual government officials and the government
itself are active participants in the real estate market rather than
neutral referees, they may personally benefit or suffer depending on
how a given problem is resolved. Thus, they are likely to take their
own self-interest into account as they fashion responses to these
pressing questions.14
Assuming that these features will continue to hold true in the
future, it becomes possible to predict how China will respond as large
numbers of land use rights approach their expiration dates. This
Article proceeds as follows: Part II discusses the renewability of the
Chinese land use right and describes the government’s alternatives
when land use rights expire. Part III examines how the government
has behaved in the past in an effort to forecast how it will address
renewability questions. And Part IV places the resolution of these
important questions in the broader context of the uneven movement
toward the rule of law in China’s real estate markets.
II. CHINESE LAND USE RIGHTS: SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE
EXPIRATION PROBLEM
Unlike the common law fee simple, the Chinese land use right
has an expiration date. The maximum duration for a land use right is
seventy years for residential property, fifty years for industrial
property, and forty years for commercial property; the Western fee
simple, by contrast, is theoretically perpetual.15 So, although the

11.
See infra Part III.
12.
See Stephen R. Platt, Is Chine Ripe for a Revolution?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/opinion/sunday/is-china-ripe-for-a-revolution.
html (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/Z6AW-L3JM] (archived Feb. 1, 2017)
(“Beijing has learned its lessons from the past. We see this in the swift and ruthless
suppression of Falun Gong and other religious sects that resemble the Taiping before
they became militarized.”); infra Part III.
13.
See GREGORY M. STEIN, MODERN CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW: PROPERTY
DEVELOPMENT IN AN EVOLVING LEGAL SYSTEM 85–102 (2012).
14.
Id. at 46–48 (describing various ways in which the government has been a
participant in the real estate market).
15.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan
Churang He Zhuanrang Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on Assigning and
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Chinese land use right is not a ground lease, it does display some of
the same legal and economic characteristics of a ground lease.16
Three of the biggest questions Chinese real estate law will face
in the coming years are whether the holder of a land use right has the
power to renew it and, if so, what the duration of that renewal will be
and what the cost of that renewal will be. The Property Rights Law
addresses the first of these questions somewhat obliquely in Article
149:
The term of the right to use land for construction for dwelling houses shall be
automatically renewed upon expiration. The term of the right to use land for
construction not for dwelling houses shall be renewed according to legal
provisions. Where there are stipulations about the ownership of houses and
other real properties on the aforesaid land, such stipulations shall prevail; if
there is no such stipulation or the stipulations are not explicit, the ownership
shall be determined according to the provisions in the laws and administrative
regulations.17

Article 22 of the Law on the Administration of Urban Real
Estate muddies the waters still further, stating that renewals “shall
be approved” in most cases.18 That article also notes that “the land
user shall enter into a new contract for the granting of the land-use
right and pay fees for the granting in accordance with the relevant
regulations,” but it does not discuss the method of calculating this
renewal fee.19
Current holders of residential land use rights thus have no idea
of the length of their renewal terms or the cost of those renewals,
while current holders of commercial or industrial land use rights do
not even know whether they will be able to renew their rights at all.20
If a land use right is not renewed, neither of these articles suggests
that the government must pay the departing holder of the land use
right for the value of any improvements on the land, even though that
holder may have constructed those improvements at its own expense
or bought the property at a price that reflected the value of previously

Transferring the Urban State-Owned Land-Use Right] (promulgated by the State
Council, May 19, 1990, effective May 19, 1990), Peking U. art. 12 (China) (setting
different terms for different uses of the land).
16.
See STEIN, supra note 13, at 34–35 (contrasting the Chinese land use right
and the Western ground lease).
17.
Wuquan Fa [Property Rights Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), P.R.C. LAWS art. 149
(China). Note that nothing in Article 149 requires that the renewal term for residential
property be for an additional seventy years.
18.
Chengshi Fangdichan Guanli Fa [Law on the Administration of Urban Real
Estate] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994,
revised Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 30, 2007), P.R.C. LAWS art. 22 (China).
19.
Id.
20.
For a general discussion of the renewability of land use rights, see STEIN,
supra note 13, at 37–40.
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existing improvements. Such an owner may expect, perhaps
incorrectly, to receive compensation for the value of these
improvements.21
China has recognized land use rights only since the late 1980s,
which means that just a handful of these rights—created initially for
less than the maximum term—have come up for renewal.22 There
thus is little useful history to guide the hundreds of millions of
current holders of Chinese land use rights. The failure to resolve this
uncertainty is likely to impose an increasing drag on the real estate
market as existing land use rights age.23 The Chinese Communist
Party does seem to be aware of and concerned about the problems
that uncertainty in the real estate market can create,24 but important
questions about the renewability of land use rights remain
unanswered.
A. Possible Renewal Prices
Once the Chinese government decides to address whether land
use rights are renewable, and at what price, the government could
calculate the renewal fee in a variety of different ways. This Section
discusses these options, highlighting the advantages and
disadvantages of each. Note that these alternatives overlap to some
degree, as will become evident from the discussion that follows.

21.
Of course, any owner’s expectations as to the compensability and value of
those improvements must be shaped by its knowledge of Chinese real estate law,
including all of that law’s uncertainties. This point demonstrates some of the
circularity inherent in any discussion of Chinese real estate law and the renewability of
land use rights.
22.
See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
23.
See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE
REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD 152–58 (1989) (describing the systemic costs of
working around inadequacies in the legal system of Peru).
24.
See COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, DECISION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ON SOME MAJOR ISSUES CONCERNING
COMPREHENSIVELY DEEPENING THE REFORM, ADOPTED AT THE THIRD PLENARY SESSION
OF THE 18TH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (Nov. 12, 2013),
at II.5, http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602
.htm [hereinafter Third Plenum] [https://perma.cc/H73Y-LRQQ] (archived Feb. 3, 2017)
(“Property rights are the core of ownership. We need to improve the modern property
rights system with clear ownership, clear-cut rights and obligations, strict protection
and smooth flow. The property rights of the public sector are inviolable, as are those of
the non-public sector.”).
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1. Renewal of the Land Use Right at a Price that Is Equal to Fair
Market Value
Begin by assuming that the government will readily renew all
land use rights, as Article 149 plainly requires for residential
rights.25 If the government allows existing holders of land use rights
to renew those rights, it next must decide how much to charge for
these renewal rights. One possibility is that the government will
charge the renewing holder a price equal to the fair market value for
the land use right at the time of the renewal. The original holder paid
fair market value for a seventy-year term, enjoyed the use of that
property for seventy years, and could renew by paying fair market
value again, seventy years later, for a second term.26
If the government decides to charge full fair market value for
renewals, the price for renewing a land use right would be set in
exactly the same manner that the price for acquiring the right was
established in the first instance. The only difference would be that
the price for the renewal would be the fair market value at the time of
the renewal—presumably higher than before—and not the fair
market value at the time of the initial creation of the right. In effect,
seventy years after the right was created, the government would be
treating a renewal right as a new property interest. In this sense, the
land use right would closely resemble a lease, particularly a ground
lease.27
This approach seems fair in many ways. The original owner
acquired a land use right for a fixed period of time at a price that
reflected the value of the property for that duration as determined on

25.
Note, however, that Article 58 of the Land Administration Law allows the
government to retake possession of land that was previously subject to a land use right
if the holder of the right seeks an extension that is not approved. Tudi Guanli Fa [Land
Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June
25, 1986, revised Dec. 29, 1988, Aug. 29, 1998 & Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004),
P.R.C. LAWS art. 58(3) (China). This language implies that renewals are not always
available as a matter of right. Since the Property Rights Law was adopted more
recently, its recognition of the renewability of residential land use rights presumably
takes priority over the older Article 58 but has no bearing on nonresidential property.
26.
Keep in mind that seventy years is the maximum term of a land use right
for residential purposes, which is the example I use in this discussion. Holders of land
use rights for other purposes enjoy maximum terms that are shorter. Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan Churang He Zhuanrang
Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on Assigning and Transferring the Urban
State-Owned Land-Use Right] (promulgated by the State Council, May 19, 1990,
effective May 19, 1990), Peking U. art. 12 (China) (setting different terms for different
uses of land).
27.
For a discussion of the distinctions between a Chinese land use right and a
Western ground lease, see Gregory M. Stein, Acquiring Land Use Rights in Today’s
China: A Snapshot from on the Ground, 24 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 42–43 (2006).
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the date the right was created. That value presumably factored in the
parties’ estimate of the total use value of the property over the
coming seventy years. For commercial property, this price should
have reflected the discounted present value of the income stream the
parties projected the property would generate over the life of the land
use right, with some adjustments.28 For residential property, which is
more likely to be occupied by its owner, the calculation would have
had to rely on the imputed rental value. 29
Predicting these values in an immature market such as China’s
circa 1990 would have presented a challenge involving considerable
guesswork. And, given how successful the Chinese real estate market
has proved to be in the intervening years, it is likely that both parties
would have underestimated property values going forward.30 But
both parties would have been laboring under these same handicaps,
and each would have been taking a business risk. The market, after
all, could have failed disastrously, and the price the purchaser was
willing to pay presumably factored in the weighted average of the
losses the holder of the right might have suffered or the gains the
holder might have enjoyed, along with the likelihood of each of those
possible losses or gains actually materializing. The fact that the
parties knew their relationship would end when the land use right

28.
For example, the parties should have factored in their predictions as to
appreciation in property values, the inflation rate, and the residual value at the end of
the term of any improvements the right holder planned to construct, assuming these
improvements could not be removed. See generally MIKE E. MILES ET AL., REAL ESTATE
DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS 177–232 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing general
methods for establishing the value of investment property). To the extent that the
parties were figuring that far ahead (which they most likely were not), the calculation
also should include the likelihood that the holder would be permitted to renew the
right and the cost of any such renewal. Once again, this last part of the calculation
introduces some circularity into assessing the value of the property. See generally
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034–35 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(discussing the “inherent tendency towards circularity” in placing a value on property
based on an owner’s reasonable expectations that are shaped, in turn, by evolving legal
doctrines).
29.
Commercial property is frequently appraised by looking at its potential to
generate income. By establishing the rental value and noting what the returns are on
other similarly risky investments, a party can determine the value of the real estate.
Owner-occupied residential property cannot be appraised in this way, because the
owner is occupying it rather than leasing it and there is no direct rental income. An
appraiser might impute a rent by examining similar properties that are being rented.
Or it might resort to looking at comparable sales, under the assumption that those sale
prices reflect the market’s assessment of what these properties would bring if they
were on the rental market. See MILES ET AL., supra note 28, at 55 (contrasting different
appraisal methods).
30.
I personally observed first-generation low-rise residential buildings in the
Lujiazui section of Pudong that were slated for the wrecking ball just a few years after
they were built. The government seemed to have underestimated just how successful
this commercial area was going to become and was subsequently replacing these
shorter residential structures with high-rise commercial towers.
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expired allowed them to cap their upside or downside risk. Forty,
fifty, or seventy years is a long time, but it is not as long as forever,
which is the duration of a Western fee simple. Setting a termination
date would leave the parties free to negotiate a new relationship later
at a price reflecting the market existing at the time of the renewal,
thereby placing a limit on each party’s risk.
This analysis raises the question of what method the government
will use to establish a fair market value for the land.31 Initially, that
price was most likely determined by sealed bid or public auction,
although there certainly have been plenty of cases in which handpicked individuals were invited to negotiate behind closed doors
without competition.32 In part, these first two methods of establishing
the value of a land use right may have reflected the fact that China’s
market in land use rights was new and property values were still
unsettled, especially in the first few years of the market. 33 Thus, the
government invited investors to bid under the assumption that an
auction would reveal the “true” market price, or at least help to
establish what that price was.34 In this way, the government could
resolve two uncertainties: the identity of the purchaser and the price
for the land use right.
With a renewal, of course, there is no longer any uncertainty as
to the identity of the purchaser, since a renewal, by definition, is
exercised by the party that purchased the land use right the first
time. If, as seems likely, the market in land use rights remains well
established and relatively stable over the coming decades, it should
be a fairly straightforward task to establish a fair market value for
the property without the need to resort to an auction. An auction for a
renewal right would be both impossible, as only the current holder of
the land use right can renew it, and unnecessary, as it will be easier
to establish a fair market value in the future than it was at the time

31.
See STEIN, supra note 13, at 35–37 (describing different methods by which
the government can place a value on land use rights that it will offer for sale).
32.
Wuquan Fa [Property Rights Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), P.R.C. LAWS art. 137
(China) (“The land used for purposes of industry, business, entertainment or
commercial dwelling houses . . . shall be transferred by means of auction, bid invitation
or any other public bidding method.”).
33.
See STEIN, supra note 13, at 36–37, 180 (addressing land valuation
challenges in China).
34.
Chinese land use rights may be sold by negotiated agreement, by
government invitation of tenders, or by auction. 2 JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW
DESKBOOK 898 (4th ed. 2014). Regulations that were adopted in 2002 affected the
process of acquiring of land use rights. See T. Oliver Yee, A Bid for a New Future: What
Are the Effects and Challenges of the New National Public Bidding Regulations on
Land Use Rights Assignment in China?, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 447, 449–51,
455–57 (2005) (observing that these regulations aim to preclude the use of negotiated
agreements for the transfer of land use rights for business purposes while also noting
the problems in implementing these regulations).
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the right was first created. The market has matured, and property
values have become more stable and easier to determine.
When the land use right was first created, the property market
was new and unpredictable, so the government established the cost
by bid or auction because it had few alternatives. It did not wish to
undercharge, but it had no clear idea what price would be reasonable.
The government wanted to maximize its proceeds from the sale of a
significant public asset, as it planned to use this money to upgrade
urban infrastructure.35 Moreover, if more than one party was
interested in acquiring the land use right, these two alternatives
were the fairest methods of making the decision and probably the
most remunerative. In the future, the property market will likely
remain well established, and the government can employ other
methods of determining the value of the property if it so chooses.
The government might employ an income-based approach and
determine the value of the property based on its potential for
generating rental income. If it were to use this method, the
government would review the recent rental history and operating
costs of the property and estimate how much an investor would be
willing to pay to generate a comparable return. The more mature
market of the future will be able to deliver this type of data, unlike
the nascent market of the late 1980s.
Alternatively, the government might base its appraisal on
comparable sales of similar parcels in recent years. With a more
established market, there should be an abundance of comparable
sales that the government can use to estimate the value of the land
use right that is to be renewed. For residential property, this is often
the most reliable approach to employ anyway, since owner-occupied
residences do not have rental histories and since many other
comparable properties are likely to have sold recently.
Finally, the government might simply look at what it would cost
to replace the improvements on the property. This last approach is
best suited to unique parcels that are neither managed and operated
for their rental income nor occupied by their residential owners, since
it will be difficult to establish rental histories or comparable sales for
this type of property. Schools, libraries, hospitals, and historically
significant structures all fall into this category. Note though that this
third method may be difficult to employ when the only question is the
value of the right to use the underlying land and not the value of the

35.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan
Churang He Zhuanrang Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on Assigning and
Transferring the Urban State-Owned Land-Use Right] (promulgated by the State
Council, May 19, 1990, effective May 19, 1990), Peking U. art. 50 (China) (“Fees
collected by assigning the right to the use of the land in accordance with these
Regulations shall be included in the fiscal budget and managed as a special fund,
which shall be used mainly for urban construction and land development.”).
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structure built on that land, as it is hard to determine what the
“replacement” cost is if the only property of concern is vacant land.
Another interesting question the government must consider
when appraising the property is whether it will be valued as though
it is unimproved or as though it already contains the improvements
that are actually on the land. Unimproved property will nearly
always be less valuable then improved property, which means that
the government could charge a higher renewal fee under the latter
approach.36 If a land use right is up for renewal, the improvements
will have been built by the renewing owner or a predecessor owner.37
This means that the current owner either increased the value by
improving the property or bought the property at a purchase price
reflecting improvements made by an earlier holder of the land use
right. If the appraisal reflects an enhanced value that factors in the
presence of the improvements that the holder constructed or bought,
then a land use right holder that faces renewal and that has been
using real estate productively may argue that it is being penalized for
its own industriousness and success or for its investment in a prior
owner’s industriousness. This owner will wonder why the renewal
price should reflect enhancements to the value of the land that it has
created or for which it has already paid a prior owner. Stated
differently, the land use right holder will wonder why the government
should be profiting from improvements someone else built.
The government might respond to this argument—somewhat
weakly—by noting that the original price factored in this
improvement value, since the land use right was sold in the first
instance at a cost that should have reflected the value of the
improvements the original parties anticipated would be built. More
aggressively, the government might argue that no one anticipated
that the improvements that were to be built at the beginning of the

36.
There are some exceptions. If existing improvements need to be removed,
for example, the property is worth more cleared than improved. This scenario is not
unusual in China’s cities, in which developers frequently plan to remove existing
residents who are occupying sub-standard housing, raze the improvements, and replace
them with higher-end dwellings catering to a more affluent clientele. For a discussion
of the process of demolition and relocation, see STEIN, supra note 13, at 61–74. See
generally Chenglin Liu, Informal Rules, Transaction Costs, and the Failure of the
“Takings” Law in China, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2005) (describing the
Chinese process of demolition and relocation).
37.
Once again, that developer may have to go to the expense of clearing the
lot, which might require the expensive demolition of older structures. Developers often
must—controversially—pay for the relocation of the prior residents of decaying
structures, which often predate China’s modern real estate market by decades. See
generally STEIN, supra note 13, at 61–74 (describing the Chinese process of demolition
and relocation). Existing structures such as the ones described in the text, however, are
less likely to merit immediate removal than those many Chinese developers acquired
in the 1980s and 1990s.
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land use term would have any residual value at the end of the term.38
Urban land use rights, after all, are sold in anticipation of prompt
construction; in fact, Chinese law strongly encourages it.39
The government will thus face some difficult questions, namely
which of the three appraisal methods to employ and whether to
appraise the property as vacant or as currently developed. However
the government answers these questions, it should not be terribly
difficult in most cases to ascertain a value for the property. After all,
the market will be fairly settled by the time the term approaches its
end, and property values should be somewhat stable and easy to
estimate. Appraisers with marching orders setting forth the
assumptions they are supposed to employ should be able to come up
with values for land use rights.
It remains to be seen whether the party wishing to renew the
right will have any input into this determination, such as by
introducing its own evidence as to the value of the property or by

38.
At one point, a government official apparently sought to reduce worry
among Chinese homeowners by publicly opining that Chinese homeowners need not
concern themselves about the renewability of land use rights because residential
buildings in China are of such poor quality that they will not last more than thirty
years. Not surprisingly, this statement caused considerable panic in the residential
real estate market. The official then corrected the earlier statement, announcing that
buildings would actually survive for forty or fifty years. If Beijing Is Your Landlord,
What Happens When the Lease Is Up?,” CHINA ECONOMIC REV. (June 17, 2013),
http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/china-land-lease-property-law-ownership-rights
[https://perma.cc/BU63-GULQ] (archived Feb. 3, 2017) (“In 2010, the Chinese media
buzzed when Chou Bauxing, the vice head of the Ministry of Housing at the time,
suggested that Chinese buildings had an average life span of 25 to 30 years. That
projection was later contested.”). See also STEIN, supra note 13, at 40.
Given the fast pace of construction, the lack of experience of many Chinese
construction workers, and the limits on governmental oversight of the construction
process, the earlier estimate may well be the more accurate one. See, e.g., How Will a
Slowing China Cope with Rapidly Aging Buildings?, CHINA ECONOMIC REV. (June 28,
2013), http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/Unstable-Foundations-Part-2 [https://perma.cc/
7BW7-4WGM] (archived Feb. 19, 2017) (“The average lifespan of a Chinese building is
35 years, according to property consultancy Cushman & Wakefield. That’s abysmal
compared to the average 74 year life span of US buildings and 132 year lifespan of
buildings in the UK.”). The one upside of poor construction to these owners, of course,
is that the poorer the quality of the building, the less costly the renewal price for the
underlying land use right may be.
39.
Chengshi Fangdichan Guanli Fa [Law on the Administration of Urban Real
Estate] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994,
revised Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 30, 2007), P.R.C. LAWS art. 26 (China):
Where one year has elapsed from the date for starting the development as
agreed upon in the granting contract and the land is not yet developed, fees for
idle land which is equivalent to twenty percent or less of the fees for granting
the land-use right shall be collected; where two years have elapsed and the
land is still not developed, the land-use right may be reclaimed without
compensation . . . .
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having some role in the selection of the appraiser.40 In U.S.
condemnation proceedings, in which the government is requisitioning
privately owned land and paying the fair market value of the land to
the owner, if the parties cannot agree on a price, then the value of the
property is typically determined in an adversarial judicial
proceeding.41 In such proceedings, the owner has the right to
introduce evidence of value, and the price is ultimately determined by
a judge or a jury.42 Similarly, in private disputes, such as
disagreements over the rental value to be charged during the renewal
term of a lease, it is not unusual for a lease to provide that the
landlord and the tenant each select an appraiser or arbitrator and
that, if these two parties are unable to agree, they will select a third
one.43
Once the property is appraised, a follow-up question for China
becomes when this amount must be paid. The renewal charge could
be payable in one lump sum at the outset, just as the cost for the
initial term of the land use right was.44 Alternatively, the renewal
payment could be spread out over time, much as tenant rent
payments are, which would allow the holder to pay an annual amount
to the government as it receives income from the land or as it uses
the land. If the government selects this second alternative, then the
renewal of the land use right will more closely resemble a Western
ground lease, in which the rent is typically spread out over the term
of the lease. This second alternative would also allow the government
to enjoy receipt of the sale proceeds over a prolonged period of time,
which might help it smooth out the rather erratic receipt of funds it

40.
Cf. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 508 (McKinney 1977) (“In all proceedings
hereunder, the respective judicial departments and the court of claims, shall adopt
rules governing the time for filing and exchange of the written appraisal reports . . . .”);
id. § 511 (“If a condemnee fails to file a claim within the one hundred twenty day
period, his claim shall thereafter be tried upon the proof presented.”).
41.
Id. § 501 (establishing jurisdiction of different state courts over different
types of acquisition proceedings); id. § 512 (requiring court to determine compensation
award after such a property acquisition).
42.
Id. § 512.
43.
See, e.g., GERALD J. ROBINSON, REAL ESTATE FORMS: TAX ANALYSIS AND
CHECKLISTS ¶ B4.13 (2016) (“The two arbitrators so chosen shall meet . . . and if,
within sixty (60) [days the] arbitrators shall not agree, they shall together appoint a
third arbitrator . . . . The majority of the arbitrators shall determine the fair market
rent of the demised premises and render a written certified report of their
determination . . . .”).
44.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan
Churang He Zhuanrang Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on Assigning and
Transferring the Urban State-Owned Land-Use Right] (promulgated by the State
Council, May 19, 1990, effective May 19, 1990), Peking U. art. 14 (China) (“The land
user shall, within 60 days of the signing of the contract for the assignment of the right
to the use of the land, pay the total amount of the assignment fee thereof, failing
which, the assigning party shall have the right to terminate the contract and may
claim compensation for breach of contract.”).
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currently endures as it sells off land use rights to fund its operations.
In fact, one problem facing local governments today is that they rely
too heavily on the sale of land use rights to pay current expenses,
which means that their well-being is heavily dependent on the health
of a very volatile real estate market. Thus, the collection of land use
right renewal fees over time might help improve government
budgeting and operations.45
If the government decides to charge holders fair market value for
a second term, renewal rights will probably be very expensive. They
are almost certain to be more expensive than the initial rights, given
that the real estate market will have had decades to appreciate and
that formerly vacant property will have been developed. Under this
approach, the owner must bear the cost of reacquiring the right to use
the underlying land every forty, fifty, or seventy years for a price that
is equal to the then-current fair market value of the upcoming term.46
In adopting this approach, the government’s position would be that
the owner purchased the equivalent of a lease, the lease has now
expired, and the holder of the expiring right has the first right to
purchase the equivalent of a second lease of the same property. The
owner’s response to this argument would presumably be that owners
have assumed all along that a long-term land use right was
tantamount to ownership, or as close as China could realistically
come to granting fee simple ownership when the system of land use
rights arose in the 1980s and 1990s. 47 The owner would argue that it
never expected the government to force it to come up with a huge sum
of money for a second time in order to retain the right to use land
that it—plausibly but incorrectly—thought it already owned.
This disagreement about the expectations the parties had when
they initially entered into the transaction goes to the crux of the
problem that China soon must confront. As a matter of fairness, the

45.
“Local government officials, interested in raising revenue, sell land use
rights beyond the level of municipal need . . . . These overzealous practices yield
profound, negative, long-term consequences.” Chengri Ding & Gerrit Knaap, Urban
Land Policy Reform in China’s Transitional Economy, in EMERGING LAND AND
HOUSING MARKETS IN CHINA 23 (Chengri Ding & Yan Song eds., 2005).
46.
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan
Churang He Zhuanrang Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on Assigning and
Transferring the Urban State-Owned Land-Use Right] (promulgated by the State
Council, May 19, 1990, effective May 19, 1990), Peking U. art. 40 (China) (“Upon
expiration of the term of use, the right to the use of the land and the ownership of the
above-ground buildings and other attached objects thereon shall be acquired by the
State without compensation.”).
47.
Adoption of China’s Property Rights Law, effective in 2007, was extremely
controversial, with opponents contending that it is contrary to the basic principles on
which the People’s Republic was founded. See generally Jianfu Chen, China’s Civil and
Commercial Law Reforms: Context and Transformation, in LAW, WEALTH AND POWER
IN CHINA: COMMERCIAL LAW REFORMS IN CONTEXT 109, 128 (John Garrick ed., 2011)
(describing the law as “a revolution in legal thought and legal development”).
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appropriate resolution of this disagreement depends on what the
parties reasonably expected at the time of the initial purchase. The
holder of a Western fee simple assumes, based on its knowledge of
settled law, that it owns the property forever, while the holder of a
leasehold knows that its possessory rights will expire on a fixed date.
Did the Chinese purchaser of a land use right in the 1990s reasonably
believe it was buying the right to use the property for a finite period
of time,48 or did the purchaser reasonably believe it was buying a fee
simple in everything but name, disguised as a multi-decade land use
right only because the government had no better political options at
the time?49 The answer to this question about owner expectations
may become quite significant, because, under the approach discussed
here, the renewing holder of the right will have to pay a very large
sum of money to the government. To the extent owners make a
convincing case, their argument may have an impact on whether the
government selects this first option of renewing land use rights at
their then-fair market value. The more that owners, as a group, can
persuade the government that none of them expected to have to pay
so much money to retain the right to use land they thought of as their
own, the less likely it is that the government will adopt this approach.
But, whatever the answer to this fairness inquiry turns out to be,
the fair answer is not necessarily the answer the government will
reach when faced with legal, political, and economic realities. The
government will have to balance its desire to maximize its income
against the fear of causing widespread unrest. 50 If holders of land use
rights recognize the balance the government must strike, as they are

48.
“Many homebuyers acknowledge that they don’t own their flats and must
at some point vacate the buildings they have treated as private property. But the
notion is a distant and abstract reality.” If Beijing Is Your Landlord, What Happens
When
the
Lease
Is
Up?,”
CHINA ECON. REV.
(June
17,
2013),
http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/china-land-lease-property-law-ownership-rights
[https://perma.cc/VJ7T-8WSJ] (archived Feb. 6, 2017).
49.
American regulatory takings law provides a close analogy to this problem.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly focused on the importance of an
owner’s investment-backed expectations in determining whether that owner has
suffered a taking. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978) (“[T]he Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have particular
significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.”); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (“Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of
eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred,
depending on a complex of factors including . . . the extent to which the regulation
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations . . . .”).
50.
See Gregory M. Stein, Is China’s Housing Market Heading Toward a U.S.Style Crash?, 29 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 193, 222 (2012) (“[T]he Chinese
government . . . wants to avoid the social disorder that might follow if thousands of
workers were to lose their jobs, their homes, their health care, and educational
opportunities for their children all at once.”).
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likely to do, they may reasonably conclude that protest, to the extent
possible in China, might be a potent negotiating tool.51
2. Renewal of the Land Use Right at a Price that Is Somewhat Less
than Fair Market Value
A second possibility is that the initial holder of the land use right
will be able to renew the right at a price that is somewhat below fair
market value, though still nontrivial. The initial holder of the land
use right would have to pay once again to retain control of the land,
just as it would in the first alternative discussed above. However, the
holder of the right would not have to pay the full fair market value of
the property, as it did when it acquired the land use right the first
time; instead it would only have to come up with a smaller, though
still significant, sum. If the original holder decides against renewing
the land use right at this reduced price, the government could
presumably remove the original holder when the initial term expires
and resell the land use right to any other purchaser at its then-fair
market value.
If the government were to adopt this reduced-price approach, the
initial holder would have a strong incentive to renew because it would
be purchasing the property at a price lower than anyone else could
obtain and lower than its fair market value. This places the renewing
party in a position to resell the property to another owner at the true
fair market value and turn a quick profit on the renewal-and-sale
transaction. No purchaser would be foolish enough to turn down such
a price discount, even if it no longer wishes to continue to occupy the
land, since it can resell the land at fair market value and thereby
make a profit.52 The owner would be selling its land and recognizing a
gain on the sale, just as it could have at any earlier point during the
initial term, or, for that matter, just as that owner could have if it had
owned the land in fee simple all along. Some of the overall gain,

51.
Examples of recent protests in China, often successful at least in part, are
too numerous to list here. See, e.g., Javier C. Hernández, More Protests by Labor Vex
China Rulers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2016 (“[G]overnment has also sought to placate
workers . . . . The approach underlines the political dilemma that labor unrest poses for
the Communist Party, which has continued to portray itself as a socialist guardian of
worker’s rights even as it has embraced capitalism and welcomed tycoons into its
ranks.”).
52.
Historically, New York City landlords who wished to convert rentcontrolled apartment buildings from rentals to condominiums or cooperatives were
required to obtain the consent of a certain percentage of the existing tenants. As an
inducement to these tenants, landlords frequently offered to sell the apartments at
reduced “insider prices.” Some tenants would buy the apartment at the insider price
and immediately resell it at the fair market price, often for a considerable profit. See
generally N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-eeee(2)(d)(ix) (McKinney 2016) (discussing the
process of converting rental buildings to ownership).
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however, would be paid to the government in exchange for the right
to continue to control the land after the end of the initial term.
This second option creates all of the same problems as the first
option but to a somewhat lesser extent, reflecting the fact that the
cost of renewing the land use right is somewhat lower. The parties
will still face appraisal problems, and the initial holder of the right
still might argue that its expectations regarding renewal costs are
being disappointed. However, by reducing the renewal price, the
government will announce its willingness to accept lower
consideration and to give the initial holder of the land use right a
break on the price. Whether this price break will be sufficient to
reduce objections by the class of renewing property holders will
depend, of course, on the size of the price break. This option, if wisely
implemented, may reduce the objections that renewing parties might
raise under the first alternative, discussed above, at a cost to the
government of reduced income from the sale proceeds. But a modest
reduction might not be adequate to quell the discontent of parties
that need to renew, and, at some point, the government may decide to
employ the next option.
3. Renewal of the Land Use Right at a Price that Is Considerably Less
than Fair Market Value
A third possibility is that the initial holder of the land use right
will be able to renew the right for a relatively modest cost. This
proposal is thematically similar to the first two, but this time the
government charges a price that is significantly discounted below the
fair market value at the time of the renewal. Once again, the price for
the renewal of the land use right might be paid in a single lump-sum
fee at the commencement of the renewal term, or it could be paid in
smaller annual installments. The latter approach would lessen the
immediate financial burden on the holder of the right and allow the
government to pace its receipt of the proceeds from the sale.
For example, the government might state that, after the initial
term of the land use right expires, the holder can continue to enjoy
the right to use the land by paying the government 1 or 2 percent of
its fair market value every year. The amount of the annual fee could
be established permanently at the outset, or it could be subject to
periodic reassessment as property values fluctuate. The modest
annual fee would be similar in both size and purpose to the ad
valorem real estate taxes that American property owners pay at the
city or county level to support local government services, such as
education.53

53.
See, e.g., Jinxia Wang & Ze Peng, Analysis of the Financial Function of the
Real Estate Tax, 4 J. CHINESE TAX & POL’Y 89, 96–98 (2014) (discussing the central
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Were China to adopt a system like this, with the owner enjoying
a perpetual ownership right conditioned only on paying the
equivalent of real estate taxes to the government, then there will be
little practical difference between the Chinese and U.S. systems of
land tenure.54 The holder of a land use right will continue to be only
that and will not legally be an owner, but this holder will enjoy nearly
all of the “sticks in the bundle” that are characteristic of common law
fee simple ownership.55 This proposed approach, however, offers the
Chinese Communist Party the ability to deny that the government
has actually sold the property to a private citizen, 56 providing it with
a type of political cover that may continue to be important in the
future.57 China, once again, will have moved toward a more Western
system of land tenure, providing nearly all of the beneficial economic
incentives of private ownership of land, while still preserving those
elements of public land ownership that remain necessary for internal
political and historical reasons.58 If this happens, then the
government would, in effect, have sold the property to the initial
holder of the land use right from the outset, but without explicitly
admitting that it is doing so.59

elements of a reasonable real estate taxation system, including legitimacy,
affordability, political acceptance, and meeting market needs).
54.
Under the American system, failure to pay real estate taxes ultimately may
lead the government to sell the property at a tax foreclosure sale. The property is sold
at public auction, the sale proceeds are used to pay off the overdue taxes, and any
excess is returned to any other lienholders and then to the former owner. See, e.g.,
Frank S. Alexander et al., Judicial Tax Foreclosures, in GEORGIA REAL ESTATE
FINANCE & FORECLOSURE LAW § 11:8 (2016) (summarizing recent changes to Georgia’s
tax foreclosure sale process). China would presumably develop similar procedures.
However, if China chooses to treat the relationship between government and occupant
as closer to that of landlord and tenant, then it might simply treat the failure to pay
the annual fee as a breach of lease allowing the landlord to terminate the lease and
remove the occupant. This process might be quicker, would probably afford the holder
of the right less due process-type protection, and may deprive the holder of any equity
is has built up in the property. It would also cause problems for junior lienholders such
as mortgagees, presumably making these parties reluctant to accept liens on property
interests that can so easily be wiped out.
55.
For a general background on the “bundle of sticks” or “bundle of rights”
concept of property ownership, see JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 102–103, 218
(8th ed. 2014).
56.
See, e.g., Shitong Qiao, The Evolution of Chinese Property Law: Stick by
Stick?, in PRIVATE LAW IN CHINA AND TAIWAN: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES 182,
192 (Yun-Chien Chang et al. eds., 2017) (“Shenzhen’s desired reform [in the early
1980s] faced an ideological challenge from Marxism: how could a socialist country that
had abolished private property sell land? In response to this challenge, the reformers
separated LURs [land use rights] from land ownership.”).
57.
See ROBINSON, supra note 43.
58.
Id.
59.
For a thoughtful analysis of the extent to which China has already
privatized its land on a de facto basis, see Donald Clarke, China’s Stealth Urban Land
Revolution, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 323 (2014). Professor Clarke notes, for example, that
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Of course, if the government were to adopt this third approach—
charging the renewing party only a small annual fee—the
government would receive considerably less money from the holders
of land use rights than it might obtain if it charged the higher prices
that are discussed above.60 Thus, while this third option pacifies land
owners because it converts the land use right into something
approximating a fee simple, it does so at considerable financial cost to
the government.
Government entities in China currently use the proceeds of the
sale of land use rights to invest in local infrastructure, meeting needs
that had been deferred for decades prior to the 1980s. 61 Without this
regular infusion of huge amounts of cash, the government’s capacity
to undertake major public projects would likely cease. 62 The
government could, however, use the (much smaller) annual proceeds
received from the holders of land use rights to fund its ongoing
operations. Again, this system would parallel those seen on the local
level in the United States, where annual real property tax revenues
are used to fund regular city and county government expenses for
education, road construction, and other local needs. This would mark
a dramatic change from the current Chinese revenue-raising system,

A fee [for the renewal of a land use right] fixed according to a formula
is . . . hard to distinguish from a real property tax if the fee is either a flat fee or
one based on the value of the property. And nobody thinks that the existence of
property taxes is inconsistent with private ownership of land.
Id. at 340. I thank Professor Clarke for his valuable and insightful comments on this
portion of my Article.
60.
This statement is clearly true if the renewing party must pay the entire
renewal payment in advance: a fee calculated to be lower than fair market value is, by
definition, less than a fee calculated to equal or approach fair market value. If the
renewing party pays the fee over time, however, the aggregate amount paid may or
may not be lower. The government should be able to set an annual fee that will, when
factoring in the time value of money, be equal to what the lump-sum fee would have
been. Of course, there is no reason why the government must calculate the annual fee
in this matter. Moreover, the government and the renewing party will not have full
information about matters such as future inflation and appreciation when establishing
the renewal fee. It is possible, therefore, that an annual fee may turn out to be higher
or lower, in the aggregate, then a single fee paid at the outset would have been.
Moreover, if the government builds in periodic reassessments, it is entirely possible
that, over time, the holder of the right will pay more in the aggregate than it would
have paid if it had simply renewed the land use right and paid the entire cost at the
time of the renewal.
61.
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan
Churang He Zhuanrang Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on Assigning and
Transferring the Urban State-Owned Land-Use Right] (promulgated by the State
Council, May 19, 1990, effective May 19, 1990), Peking U. art. 50 (China); see also
supra note 35 and accompanying text.
62.
See STEIN, supra note 13, at 142–44 (describing how proceeds from the sale
of land use rights are essential for funding major improvements to infrastructure).
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but it would offer local governments more reliable and more
predictable sources of cash for ordinary operational purposes.
If the government charges a significantly lower price for the
renewal of the land use right and allows the holder of the right to pay
this price in modest annual installments, the government would, in
effect, be treating the money it received for the first term of the land
use right as though it were the sale price for the land. The
government presumably spent this money long ago, in many cases on
badly needed infrastructure improvements and other capital projects.
By contrast, the government would be treating the smaller amounts
of money it receives annually for the renewal term as the equivalent
of ground rent or real estate taxes and would use this money to fund
its ongoing operations. This approach might well signify the next
stage of China’s rapidly evolving real estate market, as it moves away
from spending the tremendous amounts required to modernize its
roads, bridges, highways, and mass transit, and moves instead
toward a more sustainable long-term financing model.
If the government decides that the cost of the land use right will
be paid on an annual basis rather than all at the outset, it will face a
second question. As noted above, the government will need to decide
whether the annual payment the owner of the land use right must
make will be permanently fixed from the outset or will be reassessed
at periodic intervals during the renewal term of the land use right. If
the parties decide to fix the price at the outset, each takes the risk
that price fluctuations will move in an unfavorable direction. The
government will suffer if property appreciates at an unexpectedly
high rate, because the price established for the land use right will
reflect original expectations that proved to be too pessimistic.
Similarly, the owner of the right will suffer if the price proves, in
retrospect, to overvalue land that did not appreciate as rapidly as
expected.
Landlords who enter into long-term leases, including ground
leases, face similar problems. They sometimes agree with their
tenants to build in periodic rent increases of a fixed amount, although
those too may under- or over-predict appreciation in land values. 63 As
an alternative, the parties to the lease might agree to periodic rent
increases that will be set by reference to some index, such as one that
measures the inflation rate for similar rental properties, or
determined by one or more appraisers. In this way, the parties agree
to a method by which the rent will remain more or less in line with

63.
The advantage of rents that are fixed on day one, of course, is that they are
fixed on day one. The tenant knows exactly how much rent it must pay throughout the
term, and the landlord knows exactly how much it will receive. Rents that adjust in the
manner described in the text, like adjustable-rate mortgages, introduce new
uncertainties into the transaction for both parties.
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increases in the value of the underlying real estate. This reduces the
risk that the parties will miscalculate how well the real estate market
will perform in future years, replacing it with a different kind of
uncertainty: rents might increase or decrease, and there is no way to
know at the outset which way they will move or to what degree.64
Tax-assessing authorities in the United States often address this
concern by reassessing real estate on a periodic basis. 65 The goal is to
ensure that those owners whose property has appreciated at an above
average rate pay an increasing share of local real estate taxes, while
those whose property value has suffered relative to their neighbors
pay a decreasing share.66 Annual payments for a Chinese land use
right are analogous to these types of tax payments, and the Chinese
government might decide as a matter of fairness that the annual fee
levied on owners of land use rights should be recalculated regularly.
If the government chooses to act in this fashion, it will make property
ownership in China resemble fee simple ownership even more closely
than it does now. This approach also builds more flexibility into the

64.
Commercial landlords and tenants can also adopt hybrid approaches that
divide this risk between the parties. For example, it is common for commercial leases to
establish a fixed base rent but to require tenants to pay as additional rent an amount
equal to the tenant’s share of increases in building operating costs. These costs
typically include real estate taxes, insurance, maintenance, and other similar landlord
expenses. See DANIEL B. BOGART & CELESTE HAMMOND, COMMERCIAL LEASING: A
TRANSACTIONAL PRIMER 79–82 (2d ed. 2011) (examining various ways to calculate rent
increases as the term of a commercial lease progresses).
65.
“[T]he constitutional requirement is the seasonable attainment of a rough
equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property owners.” Allegheny Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 343 (1989).
66.
Tax assessment schemes nonetheless are plagued with inequities. For
example, many jurisdictions reassess property when it is transferred. Under this
approach, long-term owners often end up assessed at a rate that undervalues their
property relative to newcomers, an attribute commonly referred to as the “Welcome,
Stranger!” problem. The stated reason is to ensure that owners who have resided in the
community for years are not forced to leave because their real estate taxes shoot up
when property values appreciate. The result, though, is that newcomers are paying a
disproportionately high cost for local services, often because they are not yet as well
connected politically as their more established neighbors. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn,
505 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1992):
[T]he State legitimately can conclude that a new owner at the time of acquiring
his property does not have the same reliance interest warranting protection
against higher taxes as does an existing owner. The State may deny a new
owner at the point of purchase the right to “lock in” to the same assessed value
as is enjoyed by an existing owner of comparable property, because an existing
owner rationally may be thought to have vested expectations in his property or
home that are more deserving of protection than the anticipatory expectations
of a new owner at the point of purchase . . . . In short, the State may decide that
it is worse to have owned and lost, than never to have owned at all.
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pricing system and allows government revenues to keep pace more
closely with government expenditures.67
This discussion proceeds from the assumption that Chinese
government bodies raise funds by selling land use rights rather than
by imposing real estate taxes. Note, though, that the Chinese
government has recently begun to experiment with the imposition of
ad valorem real estate taxes in a handful of jurisdictions, so this third
alternative would not be appreciably different from an approach the
government is already testing.68 In these experimental settings, the
government is imposing ad valorem taxes on parties that have
already paid the fee for their initial land use right term, so the holder
is essentially paying for the initial land use right twice. The proposal
above, by contrast, would become effective only upon expiration of the
land use right’s initial term, and would serve in lieu of a renewal fee,
or, more precisely, it would be the modified form that the renewal fee
would take. Of course, nothing stops the government from choosing to
impose both, charging the owner an annual fee as consideration for
the renewal of the land use right and imposing ad valorem real estate
taxes as well.69

67.
Shortfalls in revenue can also be addressed simply by raising tax rates.
That approach, which is typically unpopular politically, raises additional funds without
addressing any inequities in relative tax payments by different residents. Whatever
your property is deemed to be worth, you simply pay more in taxes. Reassessment, by
contrast, can reduce inequities without necessarily raising any additional funds: some
people’s assessments go up, others go down, and total tax collections may rise or fall.
Tennessee law prohibits using the reassessment process by itself as a means of
increasing overall tax revenues. Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1701(a)(3) (“[E]ach governing
body, in the event of a general reappraisal as determined by the state board, shall
determine and certify a tax rate which will provide the same ad valorem revenue for
that jurisdiction as was levied during the previous year.”).
68.
See China May Expand Property-Tax Trials Beyond Cities of Shanghai,
Chongqing, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201203-06/china-is-studying-widening-scope-of-its-property-tax-trials-minister-says.html
[https://perma.cc/49E6-N4BW] (archived Feb. 19, 2017); China Approves Property Tax
Trials to Curb Prices, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-01-28/china-approves-property-tax-trials-in-shanghai-chongqing-to-curb-prices.html
[https://perma.cc/78PG-G9HS] (archived Feb. 25, 2017)
69.
These taxes should not be confused with the different transfer and gains
taxes that are imposed when real estate changes hands. The government often raises
or lowers these taxes when it wishes to cool the market down or heat it up. See
generally STEIN, supra note 13, at 116–17. Note, however, that real property taxes can
also accomplish these same goals. See Yansheng Zhu, The Practical Choice for Real
Property Tax Reform, 4 J. CHINESE TAX & POL’Y 114, 116 (2014) (“Expansion of RPT
[real property tax] will increase the cost to hold real properties, which in turn will curb
enthusiasm for investment housing and eventually affect the total demand on the real
property market, fulfilling the goal to cool down the market.”).
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4. Renewal of the Land Use Right for Free
A fourth possibility is that the government could allow the
renewal of the land use right to proceed free of charge, particularly
for residential property. If the government were to adopt this
approach, it would be treating the earlier sale of the seventy-year
land use right as, in effect, the sale of a fee simple. Although the
government retained an interest equivalent to a landlord’s common
law reversion, it would now be conveying that reversion to the holder
of the original land use right free of charge.70
It seems unlikely that the government would select this
alternative, given how dependent it has become on proceeds from the
sale of land use rights to fund ongoing government operations.
Government officials might also worry that they could be accused of
disposing of public property for too low a price. However, the decision
might be influenced by future political factors favoring a gratuitous
transfer of the reversion from the government to the initial holder of
the land use right. For example, if the imposition of ad valorem taxes
becomes commonplace and widely accepted, the government may no
longer need the sudden infusions of cash that the renewals of land
use rights would provide. Moreover, homeowners might well argue
that this new tax effectively serves as a charge for the renewal of the
land use right and that they should not be forced to pay twice for the
use of the same land.
If China were to proceed in this manner, it would be tacitly
conceding that it conveyed fee simple ownership of the land to the
holder when it first granted the land use right. 71 China would have
effectively privatized the land, but without acknowledging this fact
for forty, fifty, or seventy years.72 Perhaps China needs this long

70.
Professor Robert Ellickson argues that this approach “would promote better
land stewardship by lessening the short-sightedness that is risked when the temporal
division of ownership is mandated.” Robert C. Ellickson, The Costs of Complex Land
Titles: Two Examples from China 21 (Yale Law and Economics Research Paper No.
441) (Feb. 16, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1953207
[https://perma.cc/Q5SZ-85VL] (archived Feb. 19, 2017). Professor Clarke is less
concerned, arguing that even under other alternative outcomes, the holder of the right
can negotiate with the government at low cost and reach an agreement that maximizes
the use and value of the land. See Clarke, supra note 59, at 359–60.
71.
See Clarke, supra note 59, at 340 (“If ‘automatically’ [as used in Article 149
of the Property Rights Law] means ‘at no cost,’ then – assuming the rule applies to all
extensions, not just the first – we are seeing the restoration of fee simple ownership: a
possessory right that lasts forever.”).
72.
There are at least some indications that China is considering this option. A
recent opinion piece in China Daily argues that residential property owners should be
allowed to renew their land use rights without charge. Yang Junfeng, Exempt
Homeowners from Paying Fee for Land Use Rights Renewal, CHINA DAILY (June 15,
2016), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/2016-06/15/content_25716034.htm [https://perma
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transition period to soften up any political opposition that might not
yet be ready for the government to sell off so much of its land. 73
Recall also that most of this land was privately owned at one
time. By deferring acknowledgment that it is reestablishing a fully
privatized system for the ownership of real estate, the Chinese
government may also be fending off potential restitution claims from
former owners of the property whose land was taken with little or no
compensation.74 Former owners whose land was appropriated and
their descendants still might attempt to bring claims for
compensation when the initial term of the land use right expires. But,
the longer the government can postpone addressing this issue, the
less likely it is that claimants will bring these cases or even know
that they have cases to bring.
It is worth noting that, if the government had sold fee simple
rights from the outset rather than forty-, fifty-, or seventy-year land
use rights, the price differential between the two would likely have
been trivial. The fair market value of owned commercial property is
nothing more than the discounted present value of all rental proceeds
forever, adjusted to reflect anticipated appreciation and tax
benefits.75 This number is probably not much greater than the
discounted present value of all rental proceeds for the next forty or
fifty years with the same adjustments: the rental proceeds due
beginning in the forty-first or fifty-first year would be heavily
discounted, and there would be great uncertainty as to the value of
the land or any associated tax benefits so far in the future. The legal

.cc/NE8F-BCXS] (archived Feb. 6, 2017). The author notes some strong reasons for
imposing these fees, observing that
[t]he Property Law talks about “automatically renewing” land use rights, which
tends to indicate “unconditional” renewal. But if land use rights could be
“unconditionally” renewed for free, why did legislators bother to stipulate the
time limit for it? More importantly, automatic free renewal of land use rights is
equal to permanent ownership of land, which would turn land use rights into
property rights and would be a drain on State-owned assets.
Id. The author ultimately concludes, however, that residential owners should not be
charged for renewing their land use rights because of the “heavy burden on
homeowners” and as a “guarantee [of] basic fairness.” Id.
73.
See ROBINSON, supra note 43.
74.
See Ho, Introduction, supra note 10, at 17 (“Although hesitant in the
beginning, the collapse of the communist world in 1989 increasingly strengthened the
central leadership in its conviction that the ideological pillar of state and collective
ownership should not be abandoned . . . . For one thing, this determination has
succeeded in smothering secret hopes of former owners or their descendants for a
return of expropriated land.”).
75.
See MILES ET AL., supra note 28, at 205–32. The same should be true for
owner-occupied residential property, which can ordinarily be valued at the discounted
present value of all future imputed rental income. However, home prices and
residential rental rates do not necessarily coordinate as closely as this model suggests
they should.
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difference between the two is that, in the actual case, the Chinese
government retained a reversion that would not become possessory
for several decades. But this reversion was not terribly valuable at
that time, and the retention of this future interest likely had only a
minimal impact on the price the government charged or the price
bidders should have been willing to pay. 76
Of course, if the government had conveyed freeholds at these
modestly higher prices, it theoretically would have been in a position
to hold and invest the differential between the price for the fee simple
and the price for the land use right and to allow that small sum of
money to appreciate for up to seventy years (though it is unlikely that
it would have done so). If the alternative investment had appreciated
at the same rate as the property, the government would be no worse
off. Rather than being able to resell the land use right at the end of
the initial term, it would instead hold the equivalent value as a result
of selling a fee for a slightly higher price and immediately investing
the portion of the sale proceeds attributable to the reversion in an
asset that produced an identical return.
Conversely, the purchaser of the land use right, who saved this
price differential when purchasing a mere forty, fifty, or seventy
years rather than a fee simple, could similarly have banked the price
differential and treated it as a reserve fund to be used to repurchase
the land use right seventy years later. In other words, the real estate
developer could have taken the extra money it would have spent had
it purchased a fee simple and invested this in an asset that it believed
would produce the equivalent return, thereby providing the funds
that it will need to reacquire the land use right when the initial term
expires. This, too, does not reflect the spending habits of the typical
real estate developer, who is not likely to be terribly worried about
ownership of the land many decades in the future. It also assumes
that the developer and each successive owner of the property will
transfer this reserve fund to the next owner or discount the transfer
price by a corresponding sum.
Of course, there is much guesswork involved in predicting future
values and discount rates, particularly in a market that is as
immature as China’s was in the late 1980s. Moreover, the investment
alternatives facing the government or the developer in modern China

76.
See Clarke, supra note 59, at 351 (noting that, at a 5 percent discount rate,
the reversion that becomes possessory at the end of a seventy-year land use right is
worth just 3.29 percent of the value of a fee simple absolute, and at a 10 percent
discount rate, the reversion is worth only 0.03 percent of the perpetual right). In other
words, if the fee simple value of property is $1 million dollars and the discount rate is
10 percent, the price differential between selling a residence in fee simple and selling a
seventy-year land use right for that residence is only $300.
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are fairly constrained.77 In fact, there is a good chance that one of
these hypothetical investors—the government or the purchaser of the
land use right—would simply have invested the funds in other real
estate, which is one of the more attractive investment opportunities
in China today.78 To the extent this real estate investor is real rather
than hypothetical, it probably did just that.
5. Distinguishing among these Four Options
It seems likely that the government will allow holders of land
use rights to renew them, because any refusal would introduce
tremendous instability into China’s real estate market. 79 The
discussion above has introduced four different ways in which the
Chinese government might resolve the question of how much to
charge for the renewal of land use rights, assuming, as is likely, that
it decides to allow the current holder of a right to renew it. As the
discussion makes obvious, however, these four options are not distinct
alternatives as much as they are different points along a spectrum.
If we assume that holders of rights will be permitted to renew
them, then the principal unanswered questions are whether they
must pay and how much. The discussion above selects four price
points along the spectrum from 100 percent of fair market value to
zero and describes the benefits and drawbacks of choosing each of
those points. The closer the price is to zero, the more satisfied holders
of land use rights will be, as they will be permitted to retain their
property rights without incurring significant additional costs or any
additional costs at all. But the closer the price is to zero, the more
difficulty the government will have finding the funds to support
infrastructure development and other government services. The more
the government decides to treat renewal rights as a source of future
funding, however, the less happy owners of Chinese real estate will
be. The government will have to select some point along this
spectrum and will have to estimate the costs and benefits of each of
these points.

77.
See STEIN, supra note 13, at 90–92 (describing the limited investment
opportunities available to ordinary Chinese investors today).
78.
See id.
79.
See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (describing the Chinese
government’s fear of instability). Holders of residential land use rights appear to have
the legal right to renew, unlike holders of industrial or commercial land use rights.
Wuquan Fa [Property Rights Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), P.R.C. LAWS art. 149 (China).
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B. When Will the Question of Renewal Rights Arise?
So far, this Article has assumed that the government will allow
initial holders of land use rights to renew those rights. Section A
considered four possible prices for this resale: a price that is equal to
fair market value at the time of the renewal, a price that is lower
than fair market value but still significant, a trivial price, and a price
of zero. It also noted the different methods the government might use
when assessing the fair market value of the property. Section A
further raised the question of whether the government will demand
an upfront payment, as it did when it sold these rights initially, or
will accept periodic payments over time.
The discussion to this point has assumed that the holder of the
land use right and the government will not devote much energy to
worrying about these renewal issues until the initial term—perhaps
seventy years long—is drawing to a close. The government began
granting land use rights in the late 1980s, and those rights did not
start to boom in popularity until the 1990s. This means that the first
round of residential land use rights will not begin to expire until
about 2058, although a small fraction of these rights may have been
granted for less than the maximum permissible term. Even industrial
and commercial land use rights have many years to run.
The parties are likely to need to settle these uncertainties long
before land use rights begin to expire, however. Those who own or
control real property make personal and business plans many years
in advance. A business may be deciding whether to relocate to larger
quarters or expand in place, and choices such as these involve making
long-term investments. A business also may wish to sell its property
interest, and the buyer will want to know the life expectancy of its
investment. Homeowners may need to renovate and upgrade their
property, which typically involves the use of borrowed funds, meaning
that mortgage lenders also need to be satisfied with the security they
will receive.
It would not be unusual or surprising, then, for the looming
expiration of a land use right to have a tangible impact on the holder
of that right twenty or thirty years before the right is scheduled to
expire. Chinese policymakers who imagine that they can defer
making decisions on these questions until, say, 2050—which is to say,
long after their service has ended and someone else must address the
problem—will likely be hearing from holders of land use rights
decades before that. In other words, policymakers will likely need to
address these important renewal questions in the next ten to twenty
years, and perhaps even sooner than that.
Short-term occupancy arrangements raise all types of moral
hazard problems, and even a seventy-year land use right becomes a
short-term arrangement as it approaches the end of its term. For
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example, the holder of a land use right that still has fifty years to run
will not balk at paying the cost of a new roof, since it will enjoy all or
nearly all of the benefits of that major capital expense. In fact,
purchasers of land use rights today acquire those rights with the
intention of undertaking new construction, which is required under
Chinese law.80 These owners obviously expect to recoup their
investment, and they probably construct buildings with an
anticipated life span that is equal to or shorter than the term of the
land use right.81
The holder of a right with only twelve years to run, by contrast,
is more likely to rely on patches or lower-quality replacements.
Rather than contemplating the lifetime benefits of a higher quality
repair, the holder will focus only on the time during which it knows it
will enjoy the benefits of that repair.82 Of course, if the holder knew
that it had a guaranteed right to renew the land use right at an easily
ascertainable price, and if it planned to exercise that right, its time
horizon would be longer. The holder of the land use right would feel
more like the owner of a fee simple, a tenant under a longer-term
lease, or the initial holder of the longer-term land use right. But at
this point, Chinese law and practice have not yet provided that
assurance to holders of land use rights, which means that current law
creates incentives not to invest in maintaining or improving
structures that are situated on aging land use rights.
The time horizon of the holder of a land use right will shrink
dramatically years before the date on which the right is set to expire.
The holder of a brand new seventy-year land use right will begin its
occupancy by treating the property very much like an owner. Nearly
any improvement it makes will have an expected life of less than
seventy years, so there is no reason for that owner not to invest. In
fact, it most likely acquired that right with the intention of
undertaking new construction.83 By year fifty, that holder will begin

80.
81.
82.

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
For a general discussion of the moral hazard issue, see RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 136–37, 161, 551–52 (8th ed. 2011).
83.
It is important to distinguish here between the initial holder of the land use
right and the party that occupies the improvements that are built on that land. If the
holder of the right is a developer, it probably plans to sell residential units as soon as
they are complete, which means that the developer’s time horizon is actually much
shorter than seventy years. But it knows that its market of potential buyers plans to
hold the property for the long term and will want to be able to sell it at some point in
the future, so it should be cognizant of what these prospective buyers will be seeking.
The ultimate occupant probably will not build the unit on its own – most urban
dwelling units are individual apartments in much larger structures—but it plans to
acquire and hold a completed unit for its own occupancy and eventually sell it. And, of
course, many residential units in China are nothing more than investment
commodities, bought and sold much like other financial assets. A significant number of
these units will remain unoccupied for a considerable length of time, so it is difficult to
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to behave more like a tenant. Later still, it will act more like the
occupant of a hotel room. By the very end of the term, the holder will
treat the property like a rental car. 84 Uncertainty as to the
availability, duration, and cost of renewal rights will raise these
predictable moral hazard concerns long before a land use right
reaches its final weeks, discouraging owners from investing for the
long term.85
Lenders will have these same concerns. Property owners
considering long-term investments in their property are likely to need
to borrow funds. Lenders that extend these types of loans demand
security interests in the real property to be improved. These
mortgages serve a dual function.86 First, they give the borrower extra
incentive to repay the loan. The borrower knows that if the loan goes
into default, the lender may foreclose and the borrower will lose the
property and perhaps its entire investment. Thus, the granting of a
mortgage interest to the lender reduces the likelihood that the
borrower will default in repaying its debt. 87
Second, the security provides the lender with an alternative
source of repayment if the borrower fails to repay the loan. The
lender would prefer that the borrower simply repay the money—its
goal is to lend money out and receive repayment of those funds plus
interest, and it has little interest in foreclosing unless it absolutely
must—but, if the borrower fails to repay the debt, the adequately
secured lender can have the property sold at foreclosure and will be
repaid from the sale proceeds.88 Thus, the granting of a mortgage
interest to the lender also reduces the consequences of a default to
that lender.89 The mortgage, then, decreases both the likelihood that

know what their owners are looking for in terms of durability. See STEIN, supra note
13, at 38.
84.
A Nation of Homeowners?: Why a Dispute in Wenzhou Has Rattled Property
Investors Across China, WEEK IN CHINA (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.weekinchina.com/
2016/04/a-nation-of-homeowners/ [https://perma.cc/SD8A-QWF2] (archived Feb. 6,
2017) [hereinafter A Nation of Homeowners?] (quoting one Wenzhou government
official as saying “[a]n apartment on a 70-year lease is like a brand new car. Those
expiring in two or three years are like second-hand vehicles which have been driven for
more than 10 years”).
85.
Id. (“[U]ncertainty could become a factor for purchasers in the secondary
market in the not-too-distant future”).
86.
See generally GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 1–5 (6th
ed. 2015) (describing the basic contours of a standard mortgage loan transaction).
87.
See Gregory M. Stein, The Scope of the Borrower’s Liability in a
Nonrecourse Real Estate Loan, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1207, 1239–44 (1998)
(discussing the moral hazard issues that arise between mortgagors and mortgagees).
88.
Wuquan Fa [Property Rights Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), P.R.C. LAWS arts. 179–80
(China) (providing for the foreclosure of a mortgage).
89.
See generally NELSON ET AL., supra note 86, at 578–698 (discussing the
foreclosure process in detail).
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the borrower will default and the negative effect on the lender if the
borrower does.
These two purposes of a mortgage become less effective the
shorter the remaining term of the underlying land use right is. Just
as the borrower has less incentive to pay the cost of a high-quality
roof, the borrower whose term has just a few years left to run also has
less incentive to repay its loan. Or, stated more accurately, the
lender’s security is rapidly declining in value as the expiration date
for the land use right nears, so the borrower has less and less to lose
with each passing day. After all, the borrower stands to lose only the
remaining term of the right, not a perpetual fee simple, and that term
is growing shorter.90 From the lender’s perspective, it is watching its
security drop in value over time as the term of the land use right
draws to a close.91 If the lender has the ability to foreclose on and sell
only the remaining few years of a land use right, the bidding will be
less vigorous and the price will be lower, since the purchaser at
foreclosure will be acquiring only the shrinking term of the land use
right. Thus, borrowers will become less reluctant to default and less
concerned about the consequences of defaulting.
Experienced lenders will recognize these problems before
extending the loan, of course. This means that, during the later years
of the term, when the expiration date is approaching, lenders will
become less and less willing to extend significant credit to holders of
land use rights. They know that, as the land use right nears the end
of its term, the borrower has less incentive to repay the debt and less
to lose if it fails to repay that debt. Thus, as land use rights approach
their expiration, holders of those rights will be unable to borrow
funds secured by mortgages on their land.
Landlords and tenants under Western ground leases are quite
familiar with this problem, and they deal with it in a variety of
productive ways. Landlords may provide tenants with the ability to
extend the lease near the end of the term. This reduces the moral
hazard problem noted above by increasing the duration and value of
the tenant’s interest in the real property before the tenant has any
reason to lose interest in maintaining it. The tenant that wishes to
remain on the premises and improve them can extend the lease and
know that it will benefit personally from those improvements. It thus
has more in the way of security to offer to prospective lenders.
Many ground leases contain built-in renewal options, although
even if a tenant renews its lease one or more times there will

90.
See Stein, supra note 87, at 1239–44 (discussing the moral hazard issues
that arise between mortgagors and mortgagees).
91.
Of course, if the loan is amortizing in full or in part, the amount of the debt
is also shrinking over time. For an example of this phenomenon, see NELSON ET AL.,
supra note 86, at 2–4.
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ultimately be a termination date.92 In other cases, the parties will
negotiate a lease extension many years before the original lease ends:
rather than agreeing in the original lease to give the tenant a
unilateral right to extend the lease, the parties instead negotiate an
extension on mutually acceptable terms partway through the lease
term. This approach is common, for example, in Hawaii and in
London, where ground leases underlying residential dwelling units
are common.93 It also is not unusual for the tenant under a ground
lease to enjoy a right to purchase the property in fee simple at the
end of the term.94 In fact, these purchase options are not terribly
different from the four alternatives discussed in the previous
Section95 in that they provide the parties with a greater level of
certainty about what happens when the initial term expires and how
much the tenant will have to spend if it wishes to remain on the
property. Ground leases, though, are more likely than land use rights
to establish either a renewal price or a method of establishing that
price long before the initial term ends. In other words, landlords and
tenants operating under ground leases have learned how to reduce
uncertainty and the associated moral hazard.
What does all of this mean for the Chinese real estate market?
As the initial expiration date approaches, holders of land use rights
will gradually become less inclined to maintain and repair their
property, lenders will become less willing to extend credit, real estate
will begin to deteriorate, and no one will have sufficient incentive to
repair it. Prices will then drop due to declining property quality,
unavailability of mortgage financing, and uncertainty about future
renewals. All of this will start to happen many years before the first
land use rights expire, as uncertainty becomes a large and everincreasing drag on China’s real estate markets.

92.
Some states limit the duration of leases by statute. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 718 (West) (limiting leases of different types of real property to terms ranging from
35 to 99 years).
93.
Ground leases are common in Hawaii for reasons particular to the history
of that state. For a good background description of Hawaiian land ownership, see Haw.
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232–34 (1984). The opinion notes, “In the mid–
1960’s, after extensive hearings, the Hawaii Legislature discovered that, while the
State and Federal Governments owned almost 49% of the State’s land, another 47%
was in the hands of only 72 private landowners.” Id. at 232. A similar phenomenon is
seen in London, for reasons that are not entirely dissimilar. See, e.g., Julie Satow,
Rising Costs a Concern for Land-Lease Building Owners, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/realestate/rising-costs-a-concern-for-land-leasebuilding-owners-in-new-york.html?_r=0 (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/25FYHAJU] (archived Feb. 6, 2017) (“Many buildings in London are subject to ground leases
that can run for 1,000 years; the queen is often the landowner.”).
94.
See generally GERALD J. ROBINSON, Hybrid Financing, in FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF REAL ESTATE ¶ 8.03[2] (2017) (discussing split financing and saleleasebacks with repurchase options).
95.
See supra Section II.A.
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To avert these problems—which will arise in addition to any
other concerns that investors may have about Chinese real estate
markets—China will need to inject some certainty into the market for
land use rights. It will need to clarify whether nonresidential rights
may automatically be renewed by their holders, as residential rights
can be under Article 149 of the Property Rights Law. 96 The
government will also need to establish the duration of all of these
renewals. And, perhaps most importantly, the government will have
to come up with a fair, reliable, and predictable method of
establishing a price for these renewals so that investors and lenders
can evaluate more accurately the long-term value of individual
parcels of real estate.
III. WHICH SOLUTION IS THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT MOST LIKELY TO
SELECT?
Part II listed and examined several important reasons why the
Chinese government will need to inject some certainty into the real
estate market long before land use rights expire in large numbers. It
also elaborated on some of the alternatives the government might
consider when addressing the renewability and renewal cost of land
use rights. Part III will look at past Chinese government practice in
an effort to predict which of these alternatives the government is
most likely to select, as well as to forecast some answers to the other
questions raised in the previous Part. In other words, of the possible
solutions just described, which one is the government most likely to
choose and how will it be implemented? The government has not yet
had much reason to respond to these knotty questions, and the public
is not yet pressing for resolutions, though it surely will begin to do so
before long. Until that happens, the government does not wish to take
any potentially controversial action that will be difficult or
embarrassing to modify in the future.
In the next ten to twenty years, holders of industrial and
commercial land use rights will wish to renovate or expand but will
have little confidence that they can control their property long enough
to benefit from the labor and expense. They also will be unable to
obtain loans from hesitant banks to fund construction or renovation
costs. These holders of land use rights might wish to sell but will be
unable to entice potential buyers who fear losing the property too

96.
Wuquan Fa [Property Rights Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), P.R.C. LAWS art. 149
(China).
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soon. A real estate industry that is dominated by powerful and wellconnected people is likely to press for greater clarity soon. 97
Similarly, hundreds of millions of homeowners will become
uneasy as rights to the land on which their homes sit approach their
termination date. Like industrial and commercial owners, they will
have difficulty renovating, selling, or borrowing. And local
governments that have sold off rights underlying much of their most
desirable land will wonder how they can fund future government
operations with few valuable assets left to sell. These governments
will yearn for the greater certainty, predictability, and comfort of
regular tax receipts or proceeds from the resale of land use rights.
Before long, powerful interest groups will press the government for
answers. China must provide those answers soon.
By examining recent Chinese history, it is possible to make some
predictions as to how the government will respond to questions about
the renewability of land use rights. These are only predictions, but
they are informed by past behavior that offers clues to future
government action.
As noted above, three concerns seem to dictate much of the
government’s policy toward real estate. First, the government does
not wish to create or exacerbate social unrest. As the nation’s recent
explosive economic growth begins to slow, the government fears that
it will be unable to pacify restless citizens who were willing to accept
certain incongruities as long as their economic status kept
improving.98 The people of China have enjoyed continuous
improvements in their standard of living, but, if that were to change,
a government that came to power “at the barrel of a gun” fears that it
could lose its power in much the same way.99 Although Chinese law
purports to protect private property rights, it also places limits on
those rights. China’s Property Rights Law even includes provisions
that require property owners to take communitarian principles into
consideration.100 But if restrictions on property rights prove to be too

97.
See Rita Yi Man Li & Yi Yut Li, Is There a Positive Relationship Between
Law and Economic Growth? A Paradox in China, 9 ASIAN SOC. SCI. 19, 25 (2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2290481 [https://perma.cc/48VC-3B
XQ] (archived Feb. 4, 2017) (discussing guanxi).
98.
A Nation of Homeowners?, supra note 84 (“[I]f the fee is set at a third of the
property’s current value – the figure that emerged from Wenzhou this month – the
howl from homeowners will be heard across China.”).
99.
See, e.g., Platt, supra note 12.
100.
Wuquan Fa [Property Rights Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), P.R.C. LAWS art. 7 (China)
(“In acquiring or exercising a real right, one shall abide by the law, respect social
morals and may not damage the public interests or the legitimate rights and interests
of any other person.”); id. art. 84 (2007) (“In the spirit of providing convenience for
production, life of the people, enhancing unity and mutual assistance, and being fair
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great, the government fears what might happen next. Tens of
millions of homeowners who must either come up with large amounts
of money or lose their homes are unlikely to make this unappealing
choice placidly, and the government knows that. 101
Second, the government does not wish to adopt legislation or
promulgate regulations until the private sector has had an
opportunity to experiment. China has demonstrated that it is willing
to allow its legal system to evolve in synergy with changing business
standards.102 Its government has little experience in addressing these
types of questions, while its vibrant entrepreneurial class seems more
than willing to experiment with new business methods and practices.
China’s government does not wish to stifle innovation or damage
relatively settled expectations. 103 If anything, the legal system has
struggled to keep pace with emerging business norms,104 and laws
often seem to be drafted in response to the development of successful
business practices rather than the reverse.105

and reasonable, neighboring users of the real property shall maintain proper
neighborhood relationship.”).
101.
See, e.g., Ren Wei, China’s Grey-Area for Property Buyers: Homeowners
Face Doubts over Renewing Land-Use Leases, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 19,
2016), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1936991/chinas-grey-area-propertybuyers-homeowners-face-doubts-over [https://perma.cc/NH9Y-CWC9] (archived Feb. 1,
2017) (“Millions of homeowners across the mainland are watching what happens in
Wenzhou fearing that their own property investments could be thrown into question
when their leases expire.”).
102.
See generally STEIN, supra note 13, at 19–28 (demonstrating how laws and
business practices have not developed precisely in tandem, with laws often lagging
behind the development of business practices).
103.
See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 59, at 343–45 (observing how Chinese
accounting principles regarding amortization of buildings constructed on land use
rights have varied to reflect legal changes in the meaning of those rights).
104.
See, e.g., Qiao, supra note 56, at 191–93 (describing how Shenzhen
experimented by creating land use rights before they were legal, Guangdong Province
then legalized them, and the Chinese Constitution and Land Administration Law then
were amended to authorize the creation of land use rights; the author observes how
this change in practice was motivated by private and public actors seeking to imitate
practices in Hong Kong); id. at 204 (observing how China is “rearranging the sticks [in
the property “bundle”] to adapt to social and economic developments, which often run
well ahead of the legislature” and “try[ing] to accommodate new changes in reality . . .
through gradual policy and legal reforms”).
105.
This informality is seen in other parts of the Chinese economy as well.
Rural migrants to China’s rapidly growing cities often dwell in informal housing of
questionable legality, where they enjoy only limited health, education, and retirement
benefits. Nor is this phenomenon unique to China, with other countries also displaying
a disjunction between published laws and actual practices. See, e.g., Jean-Louis van
Gelder, Pardoxes of Urban Housing Informality in the Developing World, 47 L. & SOC.
REV. 493, 494 (2013) (noting the persistence of informal housing arrangements in Latin
America); id. at 495 (“[G]overnments confronted with illegal land occupation may evict
informal occupants, but may also formalize their tenure and incorporate these
settlements into the legal fabric of the city.”).
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Third, the government—along with many individual officials
working within the government—wants to continue to benefit
personally from the ongoing real estate boom.106 The government
owns a valuable asset—urban land—and it needs the continuing
proceeds from the sale of rights to that land.107 It uses sales contracts
as a rudimentary form of zoning by including use restrictions in those
contracts.108 It controls many of the nation’s major lenders.109 It
participates as a partner in numerous lucrative real estate
projects.110 Individual government officials also invest in many of
these real estate developments, despite the obvious conflict of interest
such investments can create.111 And real estate developers often have
strong personal relationships with government officials. 112 Any
prediction as to how the government will act in the future must
acknowledge the personal stake that many decision makers have in
the outcome of this process. If these three trends continue in the
future, as seems likely, then it becomes possible to view some of the
options described in Part II as more probable than others.
A. Residential Property
If the past is a reliable guide, the central government will do
whatever it takes to keep the residential market calm and
homeowners placid. The very last thing the government wants to do
is act in a way that causes hundreds of millions of citizens to believe
that their single largest asset is unstable. Many residential units are
owned by their occupants, while many others are owned by individual
investors who treat one or more vacant apartments as their
retirement nest egg.113 Nothing is more likely to cause public unrest

106.
See STEIN, supra note 13, at 46–48 (discussing government participation in
real estate ventures).
107.
Id. at 57–58, 97.
108.
RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 3, at 391–92 (setting forth the provisions
regulating land use contained in one of the official forms of contract for granting land
use rights on state-owned land).
109.
Gregory M. Stein, Mortgage Law in China: Comparing Theory and Practice,
72 MO. L. REV. 1315, 1341–52 (2007) (discussing how the Chinese government controls
most of the nation’s leading banks).
110.
See Zhe Huang, The Transformation of Social Obligations of Land Rights
on State-Owned Land in China, 42 PUBLIC SECTOR 100, 107 (2016) (“After the
municipal government reclaimed its control over urban land, it quickly established its
own real estate development business and partnered with commercial developers to
undertake new real estate projects.”) (footnote omitted).
111.
STEIN, supra note 13, at 87–88, 135–38 (describing these conflicts of
interest).
112.
Id. at 36, 44–50, 135–136 (discussing these types of personal relationships).
113.
See, e.g., Joe McDonald, China Housing Slump Sparks Fear for Economy,
S.D. UNION LEADER (June 12, 2014), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-chinahousing-slump-sparks-fears-for-economy-2014jun12-story.html [https://perma.cc/S9PR-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2565563

2017]

what will china do when land use rights expire

661

than hundreds of millions of people losing their homes, their
retirement income, or both.114 It is nearly inconceivable that the
central government will act in any way that shakes the confidence of
the many recent homebuyers who believe that their home is a solid
investment of great and ever-increasing value.115
All of this suggests that homeowners will enjoy the right to
renew their residential land use right, as Article 149 of the Property
Rights Law seems to require. Moreover, the cost is not likely to be
excessive. The government might theoretically be on solid ground
were it to charge the renewing right holder the full fair market value
of the land (perhaps even calculated in a way that maximizes its own
profits by including the value of the improvements), but such an
approach will seem punitive.116 Property owners will object to having
to repurchase land use rights they have already paid for once,
particularly when the value of that right has been enhanced by
improvements they either built themselves or purchased from
someone else. The public outcry would likely be considerable.
The government might instead charge the renewing holder the
fair market value of the land (calculated excluding the value of the
improvements), but even this less onerous approach seems difficult to
support.117 Legally, the government might have a reasonable
argument that this method is justified and was foreseeable. After all,
the homeowner built or purchased a home on land it knew it would
control for only seventy years. However, many homeowners still will
claim that they were taken by surprise and did not expect to incur
such a large cost for a second time. Some might not be able to afford
an expense this large, and the many who are unable to make this
huge payment might lose their homes and their largest investment.
Social norms and expectations would influence, and probably
outweigh, the government’s technically legal ability to charge the
then-current market price.118
More likely, and given the government’s desire to keep the
owners of residential property somewhat pacified, the government
will allow homeowners to renew their land use rights at a more

XSF2] (archived Feb. 1, 2017) (“Investors who own multiple apartments often leave
them vacant while they wait for prices to rise, prompting complaints by would-be
renters about lack of supply. China had 49 million such vacant apartments in August
[2013], or 22.4 percent of the total of 218 million.”).
114.
See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
115.
Local governments might not agree, and might focus more on the revenues
they may lose. See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 13, at 57–60 (describing tensions between
the central government and the provinces over land policy).
116.
See supra subsection II.A.1.
117.
See id.
118.
See, e.g., A Nation of Homeowners?, supra note 84 (quoting one comment
posted to an online bulletin board as saying, “So we are back to 1956. The government
can simply nationalise our private properties at will”)
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modest cost.119 Furthermore, it seems probable that the government
will permit renewing parties to pay for their renewal rights in regular
installments of a lesser amount rather than requiring a single large
payment at the commencement of the renewal term. Many
homeowners are unlikely to be able to come up with the amount
needed to renew a land use right in one single payment, even if the
price is calculated at well below fair market value. Moreover,
governments will no longer have to meet the huge infrastructure
demands they have faced for the past quarter-century but will need
regular and steady revenues to pay for ongoing operational costs.
These charges could be characterized as renewal fees or rent to
maintain the appearance that the government is still the legal owner
of the underlying land. Alternatively, they might simply be
denominated as real estate taxes, as they are in the United States,
which would be a tacit acknowledgment that the holder of the initial
land use right now owns the property outright. Practically and
financially, the effect is the same: the homeowner keeps the home
and must make modest regular payments to the government, which
the government then uses to fund its ongoing operations. 120
Denominating the charges as rent or renewal fees, however, allows
the government to maintain the fiction that it still has a reversionary
right in the underlying land, a fiction that may remain important for
internal political reasons.121
Such an approach would reduce the likelihood that the
government will face massive public protests—the first criterion
noted above—which it greatly prefers to avoid. This option also goes a
long way to meeting the third criterion discussed above, by
maintaining the ongoing health of China’s real estate markets. Local
governments will prefer an option that helps to maintain the huge
direct and indirect investments that they (and individual government
officials) have made in the real estate market. The local economy will
not suffer, nor will the net worth of the officials who have to make the
relevant decisions.
The second criterion, concerning the government allowing
experimentation before it acts, is a bit more difficult to address. To
the extent that Chinese government bodies have allowed
experimentation before endorsing successful options, they have done
so in settings in which the private market must decide how to behave.
In other words, they allow private business people to test out
different alternatives where feasible. The issue of land use right
renewals, by contrast, is one in which the government must choose
among options that only the government can exercise: private citizens

119.
120.
121.

See supra subsections II.A.2–II.A.4.
See supra subsections II.A.3–II.A.4.
See supra note 47.
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cannot extend the terms of land use rights on their own. However, it
is possible that some government bodies will have the opportunity to
test out different approaches before many others must make their
decisions. For example, the city of Wenzhou granted a large number
of leases for an initial period of twenty years, some of which have
already expired.122 When the government announced that it would
charge a renewal fee of approximately one-third of the value of the
property, there was considerable public disapproval, which people
elsewhere in China followed closely.123 It is quite likely that other
Chinese cities are watching Wenzhou closely and will learn from its
experiences when their own property owners’ land use rights
approach their expiration dates.
As previously noted, some Chinese jurisdictions are already
experimenting with imposing ad valorem real estate taxes.124 If these
taxes are set sufficiently high, the government might be able to
dispense with the renewal fee altogether or recharacterize the
existing real estate tax as a charge for renewing the land use right. If
not, the government might end up levying both charges—the tax and
the renewal fee—and enjoying a dual source of income. The important
feature either way is that the aggregate amount of these fees remains
fairly low. If citizens view these charges as the fair and necessary cost
of maintaining their control of real estate while providing the
government with funding adequate to carry on its ongoing operations,
they are more likely to accept them. Conversely, if they regard the
government as taking advantage of its position as the owner of the
underlying real estate by charging them an unnecessarily high fee to
continue to use land they have been occupying for seventy years, they
are more likely to resist.
B. Commercial and Industrial Property
Commercial and industrial land use rights raise somewhat
different issues. Many of the owners of these rights are business
entities, perhaps partly controlled by non-Chinese individuals or
entities. They are probably more financially sophisticated than the
typical homeowner. Thus, it is more likely that owners of business
property recognized and understood from the outset that a land use

122.
See Lucy Hornby, China Lease Expiries Prompt Property Rights Angst, FIN.
TIMES (May 2, 2016), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/952be9a4-0abe-11e6-b0f1-61f222853ff3.
html#axzz4EEo4z5kG (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/32ML-5HL3] (archived
Feb. 4, 2017).
123.
Id. (“Wenzhou has asked homeowners to pay up to a third of their homes’
value to renew their rights, according to a city government document, sparking an
outcry across China. The Property Law of 2007 says land-use rights can be renewed
but does not specify the criteria for doing so.”).
124.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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right has a finite duration and that they would someday be called
upon to pay a renewal fee, much like with Western ground lessees.125
These owners are more likely to have been actively involved in the
growth and evolution of the real estate market during the several
decades when it was maturing into a modern system. This means
that they should fully understand what rights they do and do not own
and that they participated in the process of experimentation that led
to the current system of land use rights. 126 Furthermore, many of
these sophisticated owners of business property have personal
connections with the government officials who will make these
important decisions, the type of guanxi that has been important in
Chinese commercial real estate development to date.127
These factors can cut both ways. To some extent, these elements
suggest that the current holder of a land use right for business
purposes will be permitted to renew that right but will have to pay a
fee that is closer to the fair market value of the land. 128 As business
entities, these owners are more likely to understand the economics of
China’s current system of property rights and to assume that they
will have to pay a large fee to renew their rights when those rights

125.
Cf. Julie Satow, Rising Costs a Concern for Land-Lease Building Owners,
N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/realestate/rising-costsa-concern-for-land-lease-building-owners-in-new-york.html?_r=09 (subscription required)
[https://perma.cc/RT7K-TXMZ] (archived Feb. 4, 2017) (describing a similar
phenomenon in New York and other Western locations). Given the limited business
experience of domestic Chinese real estate investors when land use rights were first
becoming popular, it is entirely possible that some of these first-round investors did not
fully comprehend all the terms of the deals into which they were entering. At the same
time, it would be hard for them to argue, in a nation with no recent history of private
property ownership, that they thought they were acquiring a property interest
analogous to a common law fee simple.
126.
The same may well be said of many owners of residential property, of
course. Much residential property has been acquired solely for investment purposes,
and many of these owners are sophisticated investors who are holding apartments
vacant with the intention of selling them at an appreciated price. See, e.g., 22.4%
Urban Homes Lying Vacant in China: Report, CHINA DAILY (June 12, 2014),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/business/n/2014/0612/c90778-8740395.html [https://
perma.cc/K3FJ-Y3LB] (archived Feb. 4, 2017) (observing that nearly fifty million
residential units were vacant in China in 2013, while noting the difficulties of
obtaining reliable figures on vacancy rates).
127.
See Li & Li, supra note 97, at 25 (2013) (describing guanxi as “a type of
human capital,” “an important asset for both individuals and firms,” and “an
alternative reward and punishment system”).
Personal relationships of this nature can sometimes mature into corruption, a
problem China is actively taking steps to combat. See, e.g., Third Plenum, supra note
24, at X.36 (“We will strengthen the Party’s unified leadership over the work of
improving Party conduct, upholding integrity and fighting corruption. We will reform
the Party’s discipline-inspection system, improve the leadership system and working
mechanism to combat corruption, and reform and improve the function of anticorruption coordination groups at all levels.”).
128.
See supra subsections II.A.1–II.A.2.
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expire. This is particularly true of foreign entities that may have been
exposed to ground leases and other similar devices in their past
transactions elsewhere.
These more knowledgeable business entities are less likely to be
surprised by the imposition of a large fee that should have been
evident to them from the beginning. They are not naïve, and they are
unlikely to take to the streets solely due to business frustration that
is somewhat unwarranted. These owners also recognize that
commercial property is still a valuable asset that others may prize: if
the original holder of the right is willing to pay a high price to renew
the land use right, there is no reason the government would not let
that party renew, but if the original holder is unwilling to pay a high
price, the government can find other parties eager to pay the going
rate for the land.
Balanced against these factors is the reality that real estate
entities in China are often partly owned and largely financed by the
government. In addition, real estate developers in China often have
the type of guanxi with government officials that ordinary
homeowners can only dream about. 129 These well-connected entities
are exactly the types of parties that are likely to get sweetheart deals
from the government.130 The discussion above gives several reasons
why owners of commercial and business property are more likely than
residential owners to understand why they should pay fair market
value for their renewals. These well-connected holders of business
property, however, may not actually have to pay full fair market
value to renew their land use rights.
It is impossible to know just how these factors will coalesce and
interact, particularly since many of these decisions will not need to be
made for another few years, when China’s overall economic outlook
may be far different. But, on balance, it seems likely that holders of
commercial and industrial property will be permitted to renew their
land use rights, are likely to have to pay for these renewals, and will
probably have to pay an amount that is somewhat more than
residential owners will pay for their renewals, though perhaps not as
high as full fair market value at the time of the renewal.
This result seems fair and sensible. All holders of land use rights
will be able to renew them. Residential owners will be charged a
modest renewal fee, perhaps on an ongoing basis. They will continue
to control their homes, they will pay a fair price that they are willing
to accept, and they will not be displaced. They may grumble about the
need to pay the government for the right to continue to control
property they view as their own—who, after all, does not complain
about paying their property taxes?—but they will largely recognize

129.
130.

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2565563

666

vanderbilt journal of transnational law

[vol. 50:625

and accept the need to pay and will not create too much of a stir,
particularly if the renewal rate is relatively low.
Holders of commercial and industrial property will also be able
to renew them. They will pay a somewhat higher fee than their
residential counterparts, though probably considerably less than fair
market value. They, too, will not be displaced from their property.
Domestic and international investors will accept these renewal fees
as a foreseeable and reasonable cost of doing business in China and
not terribly different from similar charges that other nations impose.
The market will continue to function with little upheaval, and the
government will enjoy the ongoing proceeds of this more reliable
funding source.
If these predictions prove true, residential property owners will
pay relatively less for the right to continue to control their land than
commercial or industrial owners will pay. The business community’s
taxes and renewal fees thus will partially subsidize residential
owners. This is a common feature in Western markets, where tax
rates are often set at a higher rate for business property than for
residential property.131 Of course, the businesses that pay these
higher fees are in a position to force these costs forward into the
economy by pricing their increased land costs into the goods they
produce and sell and the services they provide. Every citizen who
purchases goods made in China or enjoys services provided in China
will be paying more fully for what it costs to supply these goods and
services, including the increased cost of the land where the good was
manufactured, stored, or ultimately sold, or where the service was
offered. Meanwhile, the market will continue to function smoothly
during and after the years when the first wave of Chinese land use
rights must be renewed.
IV. THE EXPIRATION OF LAND USE RIGHTS AND CHINA’S PROGRESS
TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW
Real estate professionals in China seem to be comfortable
operating in a world of legal ambiguity. In fact, much of China’s
recent development occurred before there was a comprehensive
property law to govern it, with the Property Rights Law not becoming
effective until 2007.132 Other business laws filled some of the gaps, 133

131.
See, e.g., CITY OF BOSTON, HOW WE TAX YOUR PROPERTY (2017), http://www.
cityofboston.gov/assessing/taxrates.asp [https://perma.cc/9D9N-G7VJ] (archived Feb. 4,
2017) (setting forth a rate of $10.59 per thousand dollars of value for residential
property and $25.37 for commercial, industrial, and personal property and noting that
“[t]he City of Boston operates under a property tax classification system. This allows us
to charge different rates for residential and commercial property.”).
132.
Wuquan Fa [Property Rights Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), P.R.C. LAWS (China).
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but it is evident that China’s real estate community has been willing
to function with only a limited understanding of what might happen
if problems arise. Even with the adoption of the Property Rights Law,
there are still many open questions, which means that real estate
professionals continue to make important decisions in a legally
unclear environment. The law as practiced differs from the law as
officially published, and the former often informs and shapes the
latter. This pattern seems likely to continue, which means that one
can make educated guesses as to how China’s real estate market will
evolve.
At the same time, the trend in the world of Chinese real estate
seems to be toward greater formalization. China now has a wide
array of laws governing property relationships, and the earlier legal
uncertainties have been considerably reduced. Real estate
professionals have gained skills and experience and have become
better at what they do. They have a track record, they have successful
business models both in China and elsewhere, and they have greater
confidence in themselves and in the legal environment in which they
conduct their business. These professionals undertook experiments in
an unsettled market, the government endorsed some of those
experiments, and their business models became more formalized.134
Moreover, the most successful “early adopters” have done better than
their less profitable competitors in figuring out how to succeed in
China and now have every incentive to solidify their advantages by

133.
When the modern Chinese real estate market began to re-emerge, there
was no official law governing property rights. Other early statutes, however, partially
plugged this gap. China adopted the General Principles of the Civil Law (GPCL) in
1986, Ming Fa Tong Ze [General Principles of the Civil Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), P.R.C.
LAWS (China), and this early law served as a basic business law blueprint. After the
GPCL became effective, market professionals were confident enough about legal
protection of their investments that they were willing to participate in the real estate
market, and they recognized that more detailed statutes would follow. During the next
two decades, China adopted other laws to govern business relationships. Adoption of
the Property Rights Law, which did not become effective until 2007, was actually one of
the last steps in that process. But while that law was one of the last to be enacted,
other laws already served to regulate business relationships.
134.
See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 7 (1990) (describing how organizations and institutions
co-evolve in “a feedback process”); see also van Gelder, supra note 105, at 497
(“[S]ettlements often actively attempt to establish their ‘legality’ through strategies of
noncompliance with, and adaptation to, the official legal system in order to ultimately
enforce formal recognition by the latter, which gives rise to a dynamic and evolving
relationship between the two.”); id. at 510 (discussing the effects of “presenting the
authorities with a fait accompli that is difficult to return to its original form and
residents in these settlements also progressively attempt[ing] to convert the informal
tenure into legal tenure through processes of negotiation, contestation and
adaptation”).
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ensuring that future changes are more gradual. Thus, there is an
ongoing trend toward the rule of law in China’s real estate market.
Those pioneers who undertook early real estate transactions
were truly working in a Wild West environment. They certainly could
have waited for greater clarity, but these early market leaders feared
missing an opportunity that might not arise again in their lifetimes.
They foresaw the possibility of huge gains in an emerging market,
and they were willing to take the risks inherent in an uncertain legal
environment in exchange for tremendous potential returns. This bet
appears in retrospect to have been a wise one for many of the earliest
investors in the Chinese real estate market.
Legal change came slowly, for practical and political reasons.
Practically, it simply was not possible for China to adopt all the laws
it needed immediately. The task was just too big and the country was
changing too rapidly. Moreover, the leadership wanted to learn from
these early adopters, who were willing to create and use untested
new models in the hope that the government would later endorse
them. The government’s goal was to let entrepreneurs experiment,
see what worked well and what did not, and nurture the most
successful methodologies that the market developed.
Politically, China could not stray too far from the communist
principles that discouraged the re-privatization of real property. 135
Rather, it created the land use right, a compromise that allows
private entities to control real property that is still technically owned
by the state. By following this approach, China was able to enjoy
many of the economic benefits of private ownership of real estate
without technically relinquishing public ownership and unleashing a
political backlash.136
Once the new land use right became fairly stable and
predictable, the first round of entrepreneurs grew more confident that
their business models would continue to succeed. They were already
doing well, and the government was acting to ensure that they could
continue to do so. Greater legal and political predictability thus
supplanted the earlier uncertainty. Moreover, those earliest

135.
See STEIN, supra note 13, at 28–31 (discussing the controversial legislative
history of the Property Rights Law); see also PETER HO, INSTITUTIONS IN TRANSITION:
LAND OWNERSHIP, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND SOCIAL CONFLICT IN CHINA 41 (2005) (“Land
policy-making is, therefore, an alternation between restraining practices that exceed
legal boundaries and giving space to experimentation by formulating intentionally
unclear policies and laws.”).
136.
For a valuable discussion of the sequencing of Chinese legal and economic
development, see Alice Xie, Revising the Law-Growth Hypothesis: A Case Study of
Reform-Era China, 6 NW. INTERDISC. L. REV. 155, 178 (2013) (“Not only can economic
activity flourish in the absence of law, but it may actually stimulate and inspire the
development of the legal system.”); id. at 157 (“China is a case in point of how
alternative mechanisms to the rule of law, and indeed wholly alternative systems, can
sustain such conditions to yield spectacular economic growth.”).
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entrepreneurs developed the experience, self-assurance, and guanxi
they needed to remain industry leaders in the future.
If anything, greater adherence to the rule of law has locked in
the first-mover advantage of these professionals. They developed
rules and practices from which they profited, sometimes
spectacularly, and now they want to institutionalize those rules and
practices and continue to enjoy their benefits. The knowledge, skill,
size, and business connections of these first-generation investors,
combined with a legal system that encourages innovation less than in
the past, all help to ensure that these leaders will remain influential
in the real estate business.137 In today’s real estate market, there still
is experimentation and there still are unanswered questions. But
there also is more experience, more formal law, and more of the
attributes of a rule-of-law system. And the people who have the most
to lose want that trend to persist.138
For that trend to continue, though, there must be greater
certainty as to the renewability of land use rights. Current holders of
those rights care greatly about whether they will be able to renew
their rights, for how long, and at what price. As those land use rights
approach their expiration date, the well-connected holders of these
rights will press for greater clarity. 139 Given the extent to which the
stability of China’s real estate markets depends on the answers to
these questions, it seems certain that the government will have to
respond sooner rather than later.
Early risk-preferring entrepreneurs may have benefited initially
from an unpredictable system with little clarity and many unresolved
questions. Now that they have become leaders in their fields,
however, they want just the opposite: transparency, certainty, and
the absence of doubts about the future. These are the ways in which
they can protect their existing investments and limit competition
from the next generation of upstart real estate developers.

137.
See Huang, supra note 110 (“The first generation of such private developers
had certain advantages either because of their unique relationship to government
officials or party leaders or because of their unique social status.”) (footnote omitted).
138.
See Li & Li, supra note 97, at 25–27 (noting how guanxi has served as an
informal enforcement system in China but suggesting that it needs to be supplanted by
rule-of-law principles as the Chinese economy becomes more complex and China’s
citizens become more mobile).
139.
To some extent, this statement presumes that these rights holders will like
the answers once the uncertainty is clarified. If rights holders suspect that they will
not enjoy the right to renew, or will have to pay dearly for that right, they might
actually prefer a vaguer answer. After all, they would probably prefer continued legal
murkiness to a clear rejection, in the hope that they can use their influence to push for
more favorable change before the tentative answer becomes firmly set.
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Homeowners similarly want the comfort of knowing that they will not
be displaced or forced to pay huge renewal fees.140
What China demonstrates, then, is a move from experimentation
and intentional vagueness toward greater precision and emphasis on
the rule of law.141 The Chinese government was not in a position to
answer difficult questions about its real estate markets during the
1980s and 1990s, so it invited informal research and action instead. A
large number of entrepreneurs accepted this invitation, with a
willingness to risk operating in an uncertain market. These risks
were more than offset by the potential for huge gains, and many of
these pioneers were amply rewarded for their wagers. Through trial
and error, they established business practices that worked. 142 The
government observed these early efforts, encouraged further ones,
and gradually adopted laws that endorsed successful approaches.
Others then began to participate in these more stable and settled
markets, making somewhat safer bets and, presumably, receiving
commensurately lower rewards. By then though, the earliest entrants
had had the time to establish a considerable head start.
Now that they are leaders in their fields, these first-generation
entrepreneurs want to preserve their advantage. Rather than
allowing themselves to be superseded by the next cohort of risktakers, they would prefer to clarify and institutionalize the informal
rules from which they have already benefited, reduce the odds of
losing what they have created, and clamp down on competition. To
achieve these goals, early business leaders are likely to want less
ambiguity and uncertainty and clearer answers to unresolved
questions. Chief among these is the question of what will happen to
the land underlying a successful development when the initial term of
the land use right expires. This pressure for greater certainty
suggests that China will be required to resolve these questions many
years before these rights expire, which is to say not long from now.

140.
See HO, supra note 135, at 16 (noting, in 2005, that “intentional
institutional ambiguity has yielded important gains in land tenure reforms,
but . . . further deferring the clarification, protection, and registration of collective land
ownership will lead to social instability”).
141.
China’s move toward the rule of law has not been without its setbacks, of
course, and the Chinese Communist Party is aware of Western unease about China’s
progress. At the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China, the Central Committee adopted a Decision stating, “We
should work harder to accelerate socialist democracy in a systematic way by adopting
due standards and procedures. We should build a socialist country with the rule of law,
and develop people’s democracy with wider, more adequate and sound participation.”
Third Plenum, supra note 24, at I.2.
142.
See Ho, In Defense of Endogenous, supra note 10, at 1110 (“The great
mistake in the study of institutional change is to take a snapshot of that which is in
flux. Institutional change implies a shift in the endogenous, spontaneously ordered
‘rules of the game’ over time and space.”).
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The nation will have to inject greater confidence into the real estate
market and provide comfort to investors who worry about
maintaining their gains.
For all of these reasons, it seems likely that the government will
seek a solution that is broadly acceptable to the market and will
consult with leaders in the field as it moves forward. Government and
business leaders will need to work together to devise a solution that
maintains stability in the real estate market while allowing the
government to receive steady and predictable funding to enable its
own continued operation. Thus, it seems likely that China will follow
the path suggested above: it will allow all land use rights to be
renewed, it will charge a modest renewal fee—however it is
denominated—that the public is willing to bear, it will allow that
renewal fee to be paid in small installments over the life of the
renewal, and it will likely impose a lower rate on residential users
than on commercial and industrial users. 143
V. CONCLUSION
Part II of this Article raised the open questions about
renewability of land use rights that China must soon address. It then
described and analyzed several of the possible answers to these
questions. Part III suggested which of these possible answers the
government is most likely to choose. While no one can foretell the
actions of the Chinese government with great confidence, these
predictions are based on past government behavior and are thus more
probable than other alternatives.
Part IV then focused on the movement in China toward greater
formalization and emphasis on the rule of law. It suggested that the
leading players in China’s real estate market and government have
reasons for wanting to resolve these uncertainties soon. In particular,
it seems likely that China will decide these important questions in a
manner that largely maintains the status quo and will not wait a long
time to arrive at these answers.
If these predictions prove to be true, several interest groups in
China stand to gain. First-generation real estate developers will
continue to enjoy the benefits of risky investments that turned out
well: they will be able to renew their land use rights—though
probably at some considerable cost—and will continue to control their
real estate projects. They will also preserve their positions as
industry leaders. Investors in these projects will similarly continue to
enjoy gains from their investments. And homeowners will maintain

143.

See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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ownership of their residences, preventing the type of instability that
is anathema to the Chinese government.
The different levels of government will benefit in several ways.
In addition to enjoying the benefits of social harmony, local
governments will also receive cash payments in the form of ad
valorem property taxes, renewal fees for land use rights, or both, and
these fees will probably be set so that they are adequate to meet
ongoing governmental needs. To the extent that they are investors in
the real estate markets, governments at every level will enjoy the
same financial benefits as other investors. And individual
government officials will benefit personally, both as investors in
particular projects and through the maintenance of personal
relationships with powerful real estate developers. The central
government will also be satisfied, as this approach is unlikely to lead
to mass public discord.
The general public benefits from this greater stability as well.
Homeowners, as just noted, will not be displaced. Investors will feel
greater confidence in the soundness of their real estate assets.
Taxpayers will know that the government to which they pay their
taxes is more fiscally sound than in the past. Real estate markets will
mature and have a more solid footing in the rule of law. And
generalized unrest will be unlikely, since so many parties will have a
stake in preserving this system.
In short, China will likely answer these essential questions in
the near future. And its answers will serve to solidify China’s real
estate market as that market and the nation continue to mature.
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